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AZIZ Z. HUQ

& JON D. MICHAELS

The Cycles of Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence
abstract . The Supreme Court’s approach to the Constitution’s separation of powers is a
puzzle. Although the Justices appear to agree on the doctrine’s goals, in almost every important
line of cases the Court oscillates between hard-edged rules and open-textured standards. The
Court’s seemingly erratic doctrinal shifts cannot be wholly explained by changes in the bench’s
personnel or methodological fads. This Article isolates and analyzes pervasive doctrinal cycling
between rules and standards as a distinctive element of separation-of-powers jurisprudence. We
break from previous scholarship critical of the Court’s zigzagging, and instead consider whether
purposeful cycling between rules and standards might be justiﬁed as a judicial strategy for implementing the separation of powers. We further develop a new theoretical account of the separation of powers where doctrinal cycling might be justiﬁed on two key assumptions: First, the
separation of powers promotes a plurality of normative ends, and second, it does so in the context of a more heterogeneous institutional environment than a singular focus on the interplay of
the three great branches would suggest. Doctrinal cycling between rules and standards could be
used, at least in theory, to manage normative pluralism and police this “thick political surround”
when simpler, more straightforward regulatory strategies would fail. This rational reconstruction
of the feasible judicial role in the separation-of-powers context provides a benchmark for evaluating observed doctrinal oscillations, and, more generally, for determining whether courts possess the necessary institutional resources to promote separation-of-powers values.
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introduction
The Supreme Court’s separation-of-powers jurisprudence is a puzzle. The
Court endorses James Madison’s conviction that institutional separation is a
“sacred” element of the Constitution’s grand design.1 It also accepts the conventional understanding that separation of powers “make[s] Government accountable” and “secure[s] individual liberty.”2 Yet beyond those broad strokes,
the Court seems unmoored and unprincipled when it translates the separation
of powers into legal doctrine. In several lines of cases, the Court oscillates between using rules and using standards, pivoting with a surprising alacrity that
cannot be explained by changes in the bench’s personnel, macro-level shifts in
the relative power of the political branches, or the ebb and ﬂow of jurisprudential fads.
Consider three recent illustrations:

1.
2.

3.
4.
5.



Presidential removal power: In Morrison v. Olson, the Court
employed an open-textured standard to uphold a congressional
limitation on the President’s Article II authority to ﬁre an executive official.3 But in the next major challenge to such congressional limits on the President’s removal power, Free Enterprise
Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board, the Court refused
to apply Morrison and instead imposed a hard-edged rule.4



Limits on Article I tribunals: In Stern v. Marshall, the Court
adopted a rule to reject the authority of a non-Article III bankruptcy court to issue a ﬁnal judgment on a particular state-law
counterclaim.5 Only four years later, though, the Court in Well-

Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 116 (1926) (quoting James Madison, 1 ANNALS OF CONG.
581 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834)).
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 742 (2008); see also Wellness Int’l Network v. Sharif, 135
S. Ct. 1932, 1954 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the separation of powers
“promotes both liberty and accountability”); Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2365
(2011) (stating that “individuals . . . are protected by the operations of separation of powers”); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986) (observing that the separation of powers
was designed to produce both “liberty” and “full, vigorous, and open debate on the great issues affecting the people”).
487 U.S. 654, 696 (1988) (ﬁnding that “to some degree” an executive official can be free of
presidential control).
561 U.S. 477, 497 (2010); see id. at 498 (rejecting the proposition that two layers of removal
could be justiﬁed as a “practical accommodation” (citation omitted)).
131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608-09 (2011).
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ness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif rejected “formalistic
and unbending rules” of the kind applied in Stern in favor of a
“practical effect” standard.6


Congressional regulation of presidential foreign relations powers: When analyzing the constitutionality of legislative constraints
on the President’s wartime actions, courts have relied heavily on
Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer.7 Yet such almost reﬂexive reliance obscures considerable
oscillation in the application. Speciﬁcally, in applying Justice Jackson’s framework, the Court alternatively reads statutes as narrow
rules (thereby authorizing only limited presidential engagements)
or as open-textured standards (effectuating delegations of broad
authority to the President).8 The result is a jurisprudence that cycles between pro-presidential and pro-congressional positions.

Seeming inconsistencies within and between the separation-of-powers doctrines taunt and frustrate commentators. Many simply wash their hands of
what they see as an “incoherent muddle.”9
This Article is the ﬁrst to consider the Court’s mixed approach as a potential solution to the particularly thorny problems posed by the separation of
powers.10 It makes both a positive and a normative contribution. As a positive

6.

135 S. Ct. at 1944 (2015) (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S.
833, 851 (1986)).
7.
343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952). For examples of invocations of the Jackson framework, see
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 638 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Dames & Moore v.
Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981); Nixon v. Admistrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443
(1977); and Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S.
264, 273 n.5 (1974).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 115-140.
9. Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1517 (1991).
For similar statements, see M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of
Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 608-09 (2001); M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation
in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1132-38, 1148-49 (2000) [hereinafter Magill,
The Real Separation]; and Jonathan Turley, Recess Appointments in the Age of Regulation, 93
B.U. L. REV. 1523, 1526 n.6 (2013). The complaint is at least twenty-ﬁve years old. See, e.g.,
Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels Were to Govern”: The Need for Pragmatic
Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 450 (1991) (“In the separation of
powers area . . . the modern Court has evinced something of a split personality . . . .”).
10. There has been no effort to defend as principled or sensible the Court’s habit of tacking between different norms in these cases. In a recent article, Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein explore the general phenomenon of “institutional ﬂip-ﬂops,” including by members of the
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matter, we show that the Court’s separation-of-powers case law can be understood as a form of cycling between rules and standards.11 Normatively, we develop a potentially justiﬁcatory account for such rules-standards cycling. This
account starts with two structural premises of the separation of powers. Reasoning from those foundational principles, we argue that a court might sensibly resort to rules-standards cycling as a way to promote institutional contestation over conﬂicting normative values, encouraging salutary forms of
confrontation, compromise, and cooperation within judicially imposed boundaries. This theoretical result, we emphasize, is a “proof of concept”: it provides
a benchmark to evaluate existing precedent and then to analyze the viability of
judicial enforcement of the separation of powers.
Central to our normative account are two key, if often overlooked, assumptions of the Constitution’s separation of powers: normative pluralism and institutional heterogeneity. Normative pluralism, our ﬁrst assumption, recognizes and
endorses a multiplicity of constitutional values infusing our federal government’s structure. These values include, but are not limited to, liberty, effective
administration, democratic accountability, the rule of law, and the prevention
of tyranny. These constitutional values, moreover, cannot be easily aggregated,
ordered, or reconciled. Consider, for example, the way in which the separation
of powers promotes efficiency by eliciting institutional specialization among
the branches12 and prevents tyranny by diffusing power between different
branches;13 such aims are not necessarily or inevitably commensurable. Indeed,
they regularly conﬂict. Given normative pluralism, the separation of powers
does not (and, in truth, cannot) require the maximization of a single value. It

Court. See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Institutional Flip-Flops, 94 TEX. L. REV. 485,
500-04, 515-23 (2016). Posner and Sunstein, however, do not address separation-of-powers
questions expressly.
11. We use Louis Kaplow’s now-canonical deﬁnition of rules and standards: A rule is a legal
norm given content before regulated subjects act, whereas a standard is a legal norm that is
given content after regulated subjects act. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559-63 (1992).
12. For a defense of efficiency as the pivotal separation-of-powers value, see N.W. Barber, Prelude to the Separation of Powers, 60 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 59, 65 (2001) (“[I]t is efficiency, not liberty, which is at the heart of the separation of powers.”). But see Bruce Ackerman, The New
Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 639 (2000) (attacking efficiency as a goal in separation-of-powers case law).
13. Cf. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989) (describing the separation of powers
as a “security against tyranny—the accumulation of excessive authority in a single Branch”).
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calls instead for the harmonization—or, at the very least, the cycling through—
of competing, conﬂicting values.14
As for institutional heterogeneity, the separation of powers is properly conceived as something more complex than the standard “three-branch problem.”15 The three branches of the federal government do not stand in splendid
isolation. Nor do they operate as monoliths. Rather, they are enveloped and infused by a teeming ecosystem of institutional, organizational, and individual
actors within as well as outside of government. Within the federal government,
congressional committees, a cadre of civil servants, and an assortment of independent agencies and other species of bureaucratic faction represent just a fraction of the denizens of this fertile ecosystem. Outside government are a jostling
array of lobbyists, political party structures, media actors, and domestic and
foreign interest groups. All told, these internal and external actors create a thick
political surround that shapes and channels action by the three branches, sometimes facilitating and sometimes frustrating the realization of the multiple separation-of-powers values.16
A well-grounded separation-of-powers jurisprudence must account for
both normative pluralism and the thick political surround. On our reckoning,
such a jurisprudence—sensitive to the multiplicity of normative values and
mindful of the various, thick patterns of institutional contestation inside and
around the three branches—might well take the seemingly incoherent form of
oscillating rules and standards. Such oscillations pose no shortage of difficulties
when observed in judicial doctrine. Generally speaking, we celebrate doctrinal
stability and consistency. We make sense of various lines of constitutional jurisprudence in terms of either rules or standards—but not both. First-year law

14.

For discussions of such cycling, see GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES
41-44, 195-96 (1978); and Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1099, 1174 (2005), which explains that cycling “signals a reluctance to indulge in absolutes, a
recognition of the variety of normative commitments that undergird any democratic system,
and an acknowledgement that our identities are multiple and complex.”
15. See William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831, 834 (2001).
16. In previous scholarship, we have each separately drawn attention to the signiﬁcance of some
elements of that thick political surround to the operation of the separation of powers. See,
e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Structural Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 887,
904-44 (2012) (analyzing the role of bureaucratic and external interest groups in the national security context); Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM.
L. REV. 515, 538-51 (2015) (discussing the role of agency leadership, the civil service, and civil
society). This paper builds on and connects our separate work by exploring systematically
and comprehensively the implications of a thick political surround for judicial intervention
under a separation-of-powers ﬂag.
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students have been taught certain rules (such as the First Amendment ban on
prior restraints and the federalism-inspired prohibition on commandeering)
and certain standards (such as those used for the Eighth Amendment and the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine) for generations. Not so with interbranch
relations.
Neither standards nor rules alone are likely to vindicate the separation of
powers. In important part, this is because, depending on the context, an oscillation between rules and standards has the potential to promote the sort of pluralistic political dynamics that the separation of powers is intended to foster.
Standards invite ﬂexibility, experimentation, negotiation, and contestation.17
They tend to enable a wider array of actors, championing a broad range of
normative values, to enter the political arena and make their presence known. A
jurisprudential turn to rules may, and frequently does, become necessary, to
discipline some domineering actors, put a decisive end to unhealthy or abusive
forms of engagement, and to clear paths for even greater democratic contestation down the road. Rules and standards are thus both needed to open and
close the ﬂoodgates as institutional and political dynamics and demographics
change. The willingness to toggle between the two could encourage an organic,
dynamic form of normative pluralism in a thick political surround and could
deter (and, if necessary, correct) forms of contestation that become corrupted
or decayed. The resulting doctrinal movements echo patterns observed in other
areas of the law, but rarely identiﬁed or analyzed in constitutional law.18
To be clear, we do not assert that the Court consciously styles itself as a
regulator of the thick political surround in the fashion we describe. Our theoretical account of the separation of powers has not been articulated by any Justice, nor do we have reason to think that it has in fact animated any member of
the Court on a conscious level. Our claim and thus our ambition is a more
17.

See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of Fog, 123
HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1222 (2010) (describing how vague standards can “require[] that the citizen who aims to be compliant, whether from motives of justice or motives of prudence,
grapple with the relevant moral concepts directly.”).
18. See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 598-99 (1988)
(making this observation about rules in the property-law context); Pierre Schlag, Rules and
Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 428-29 (1985) (noting the “tendency of rules to evolve or
degenerate . . . into standards, and standards to evolve or degenerate into rules”); see also
Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 149, 150 (2001)
(arguing that cycling in statutory interpretation is a consequence of “self-defeating expectations” (emphasis omitted)). A different form of rules-standards convergence has also been
documented in other contexts. See Frederick Schauer, The Convergence of Rules and Standards, 2003 N.Z. L. REV. 303, 312 (proffering a “convergence hypothesis” to explain the tendency for standards to harden and rules to soften). Our claim is one of cycling, not convergence.
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modest one. What we offer is a “rational reconstruction.”19 We take bodies of
precedent that “may seem confused and disorderly, partly or potentially conﬂicting, gappy in places,” and then “put them back together, to reconstruct
them in a way that makes them comprehensible because they are now shown as
parts of a well ordered though complex whole.”20
Our rational reconstruction provides a much-needed normative baseline
against which the Court’s actual interventions can be judged. As a result, our
main contribution is to clarify what counts as jurisprudential success (although
we also offer tentative thoughts on several lines of separation-of-powers cases).
We emphasize that even with our criteria in mind, reasonable people can still
disagree about whether courts are institutionally competent to play the role we
describe, or whether particular strands of precedent make sense. Courts, like
the other branches, are buffeted by an external ecosystem of interest groups,
and have only limited epistemic and political resources. We do not here aim to
settle the hard and contested question whether separation-of-powers challenges ought to be justiciable given these constraints. But we hope that the terrain
upon which that disagreement arises will be henceforth perceived with greater
perspicuity.
Because we recognize the central, albeit neglected, role of normative pluralism and the thick political surround, we are compelled to part ways from settled practice in another respect. Leading scholars have critiqued oscillations in
separation-of-powers jurisprudence as incoherent in large part because they divide the doctrinal world between formalism and functionalism.21 John Manning distills what has long been conventional wisdom. “[L]egal academics
have . . . discerned two basic approaches to separation of powers doctrine”: a
“functionalist approach” and a “formalist approach.”22 Manning describes this
conventional wisdom as “accurate[],” a view shared by most leading commentators on the separation of powers.23 Even recent efforts to transcend the di-

19.
20.

21.
22.
23.
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Neil MacCormick, Reconstruction After Deconstruction: A Response to CLS, 10 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 539, 556 (1990).
Id. (emphasis omitted). Judicial doctrine from a multimember tribunal is the product of
contestation and compromise among judges. A purposive account of doctrine must account
for the immanent effects of judicial numerosity. Because we offer a reconstructive account,
we bracket that complication.
For a summary of that scholarship, see John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary
Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1950-61 (2011).
Id. at 1942-43.
Id. at 1942; accord Harold H. Bruff, The Incompatibility Principle, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 225, 22526 (2007); Magill, The Real Separation, supra note 9, at 1136.

the cycles of separation-of-powers jurisprudence

chotomy are framed largely as variations of that debate.24 Although functionalism and formalism dominate discussions of the separation of powers, we understand standards and rules as part of a more helpful, ﬂexible, and forgiving
vocabulary to use when describing and making sense of abrupt, oscillating interventions.
We think that a rules-versus-standards framing is more useful for two reasons. First, as a practical matter the formalism-versus-functionalism characterization tends to imply an overarching jurisprudential worldview. Generally
speaking, judges are either formalists or functionalists, but not both—and
must, among other things, vindicate the separation of powers in a manner consistent with their chosen worldview. As a result, any observed cycling is reﬂexively criticized as apostate. Such exclusivity arises in part because formalism
tends to be associated with both textualist and originalist theories of constitutional interpretation, whereas functionalism is more often associated with
pragmatic, dynamic, and hermeneutical approaches.25 This association remains
generally true despite recent moves by some originalists to criticize exclusive
adherence to rule-based structures.26 Still, we worry that shoehorning the vindication of separation of powers into a judge’s chosen worldview gets things
backward, a case of the tail wagging the dog as it were. This would never happen so long as we thought in terms of rules and standards, tools which are
equally useful but are far less freighted. No judge would insist she be called a
“standards” judge, come hell or high water.
Second, the formalism-versus-functionalism framing tends to characterize
the central challenge of separation-of-powers jurisprudence as a dichotomous
choice between two distinct, extreme positions. Not only is there no toggling
between the two, there is also no occupying (or seeking to occupy) a middle
ground. While functionalists tend to endorse loose standards that promote a
ﬂexible balancing of powers,27 formalists derive “readily ascertainable and en24.

See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Transcending Formalism and Functionalism in Separationof-Powers Analysis: Reframing the Appointments Power After Noel Canning, 64 DUKE L.J. 1513,
1527 (2015); see also Josh Chafetz, A Fourth Way? Bringing Politics Back into Recess Appointments (and the Rest of the Separation of Powers, Too), 64 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 161, 161-66 (2015)
(offering a parallel critique of the formalism-functionalism dichotomy).
25. On the link between formalism and textualism, see, for example, MARTIN H. REDISH, THE
CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 6-10 (1995), which advances a text-based defense
of formalism; and Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 853, 859-60 (1990), which links formalism to textualism and originalism.
26. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Rule of Law as a Law of Law, 90 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 483, 488 (2014).
27. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 496 (1989) (describing the functionalist premise that
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forceable rules” from the textual accounts of separation.28 But neither polar position allows for proper recognition of a key function of the separation of powers: the presence of multiple normative values within a thick political surround.
Classically conceived formalism dictates a needlessly rigid focus on the three
constitutional branches to the exclusion of the intrabranch and external actors
that inﬂuence their interplay. True functionalism, by contrast, is too permissive. It seemingly permits any actor within the thick political surround to promote any and all conceivable values. Equally damning, classical formalists and
functionalists inhabit a Manichean world, allowing few, if any, opportunities to
oscillate between the two poles (or gravitate to a median position) as circumstances warrant. Rules and standards have at least the theoretical potential to
enable a happier equilibrium, more capacious than a narrow focus on the three
branches permits and yet still capable of imposing order and discipline upon an
otherwise chaotic thick political surround.
At the same time, we recognize and credit contemporary efforts to conﬂate
rules with formalism and standards with functionalism as important contributions to legal and scholarly conversations and debates, including on the separation of powers.29 Still, we think there is good reason to keep the two sets of
terms distinct. For at certain moments, preservation of a stringently polarized
formalism-functionalism divide undoubtedly remains conceptually and lexicographically useful.
***
Our analysis proceeds in three Parts. In Part I, we explain how several lines
of existing separation-of-powers jurisprudence can fairly be characterized in
terms of judicial cycling between rules and standards. In Part II, we introduce
the foundational concepts of normative pluralism and institutional heterogeneity, and further show that both can be discerned, albeit imperfectly and partially, as animating and inﬂecting the trajectory of those several lines of case law.
In Part III, we explore how cycling between rules and standards might, at least
“through the carefully orchestrated disposition and sharing of authority, restraint would be
found in power counterbalancing power”); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 609 (1984) (advocating a “checks-and-balances approach”).
28. Manning, supra note 21, at 1958; see also ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 29 (2006); Antonin Scalia, The Rule
of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1183-84 (1989).
29. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 21 (1998).

356

the cycles of separation-of-powers jurisprudence

as a theoretical matter, be ranked as a sensible response to the ever-changing
demands of normative pluralism and institutional heterogeneity. Here we link
our theoretical predicates of the separation of powers to the concrete challenges
of creating workable doctrines and jurisprudential principles. In concluding,
we show how our analysis can be used to explore whether courts are appropriately positioned to advance separation-of-powers values given the nature of
that task.
i. the ubiquity of rules-standards cycling in separationof-powers jurisprudence
We set the foundation for our argument by demonstrating in this Part that
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the separation of powers routinely cycles
between rules and standards. To that end, we employ now-canonical deﬁnitions of rules as legal norms given content before regulated subjects act, and
standards as legal norms given content after regulated subjects act.30 Rules
(both in general and in the separation-of-powers context) tend to be more restrictive than standards; standards, by contrast, leave the law more open to
novel and unanticipated considerations. The correlation between rules and inﬂexibility, however, is not inevitable. As we will show, in some instances rules
can leave regulated actors with great ﬂexibility, while standards can impose
heavy burdens of compliance.
To show the pervasiveness of rules-standards cycling, we analyze ﬁve discrete lines of authority. In Section I.A, we discuss the legislative delegation of
regulatory authority. In Sections I.B and I.C, we consider the design of administrative agencies, including, particularly, the removal of agency officials and
the level of judicial deference afforded to agency interpretations of statutes. In
Section I.D, we discuss the adjudication of disputes by non-Article III actors.
And, in Section I.E, we address the management of foreign affairs. By considering multiple, distinct lines of precedent, we broaden and strengthen our descriptive claim that cycling cannot simply be chalked up to personnel changes
on the Court or to the waxing or waning of jurisprudential philosophies or
fads. Previous analyses that zeroed in on only one or two of these lines, to the
exclusion of the others, understandably failed to appreciate the frequency and
transsubstantive reach of rules-standards cycling.

30.

Kaplow, supra note 11, at 559-63. For example, the norm “do not exceed 40 miles per hour” is
a rule because its content (i.e., the universe of potentially relevant facts) has been fully speciﬁed before its applications. The norm “drive reasonably” is a standard because its content
depends on the factors that an enforcer or adjudicator determines to be salient.
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Before proceeding, two cautions should be sounded. First, we concede that
our account of cycling is limited rather than universal. Not every line of separation-of-powers jurisprudence exhibits patterns of cycling. We consider those
non-cycling lines at the very end of this Part. Second, we appreciate that not
every instance of cycling examined in this Part is necessarily reasonable or principled. Given our immediate task of simply mapping the doctrinal landscape,
we do not grapple here with the logic or prudence of cycling. We defer that exercise to Parts II and III.
A. Legislative Delegations
The nondelegation doctrine seeks to restrict Congress from delegating legislative power in a manner inconsistent with its Article I duties.31 The doctrine
is difficult to apply because it is not a simple task to determine what constitutes
legislative power. In the modern era, the Court has required Congress to provide an “intelligible principle” when delegating lawmaking authority to administrative agencies. This requirement, ﬁrst articulated in the 1928 case J.W.
Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States,32 is meant to ensure that Congress guides,
even if it does not entirely specify, the terms of agency action. J.W. Hampton
remains good law today.33 But its practical effect has ﬂuctuated. Periods of dutiful adherence to J.W. Hampton’s standard-like formulation have been punctuated by carve-outs of categorical, rule-like exceptions to the standard’s applicability.
On only two occasions has the Court struck down legislative delegations on
constitutional grounds. Both cases involved provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA). In Panama Reﬁning Co. v. Ryan,34 the Court rejected
section 9(c) of the NIRA, underscoring Congress’s failure to furnish an intelligible principle directing the President’s prohibition of the interstate transportation of excess petroleum and petroleum products. Simply stated, the Court
found that “the Congress has declared no policy” to guide the President.35

31.

32.
33.
34.
35.
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Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (“That Congress cannot delegate legislative power . . . is vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the
Constitution.”). See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress . . . .”).
276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (invoking J.W. Hampton’s “intelligible principle” standard).
293 U.S. 388 (1935).
Id. at 430.
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Then, in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,36 the Court held that
section 3 of the NIRA, authorizing the President to approve of privately arrived-at codes of fair competition for various industries, also lacked an intelligible principle. The provision therefore left recipients of lawmaking power free
to “roam at will.”37
Panama Reﬁning and Schechter are outliers. Before 1935, the intelligibleprinciple requirement was glossed as an open-textured standard. Panama Reﬁning and Schechter read it as a rule demanding a high degree of legislative
speciﬁcity. But this rule-like understanding did not last. After 1935, the Court
returned to treating the intelligible-principle imperative as a standard, giving
Congress considerable ﬂexibility in its delegations.38 Explaining this return to a
standard-like formulation, the Court underscored its “practical understanding
that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more
technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”39
Schechter did more than just construe the intelligible-principle imperative as
a rule. It also layered on an additional, equally categorical rule barring delegations of state authority to private parties. This “private delegation” carve-out
barred all delegations of rulemaking authority to private parties. It has never
morphed into a standard and remains hard-edged today, foreclosing such delegations irrespective of how carefully and thoroughly Congress speciﬁes an intelligible principle.40
Over time, two further categorical rules—more carve-outs from the “intelligible principle” standard—surfaced. Like Schechter’s private-delegation prong,
both turn on the recipient of the delegation, not the scope or speciﬁcity of the
power delegated. First, INS v. Chadha41 involved a challenge to Congress’s one36.
37.
38.
39.

40.

41.

295 U.S. 495 (1935).
Id. at 538; see also id. at 551 (Cardozo, J., concurring) (condemning section 3 as failing to provide any direction to those entrusted with lawmaking authority).
See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425-27 (1944) (upholding the delegation of
broad sweeping price-setting powers to an executive agency).
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (citing Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Adm’r
of the Wage & Hour Div. of the Dep’t of Labor, 312 U.S. 126, 145 (1941) (“In an increasingly
complex society Congress obviously could not perform its functions if it were obliged to ﬁnd
all the facts subsidiary to the basic conclusions which support the deﬁned legislative policy . . . .”).
See Schechter, 295 U.S. at 537; see also Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225,
1237 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring) (“Congress ‘cannot delegate regulatory authority to a private entity.’” (quoting Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 670 (D.C. Cir.
2013))).
462 U.S. 919 (1983).

359

the yale law journal

126:346

2016

house veto over administrative decisions that the legislature delegated to the
Attorney General. In effect, the veto empowered either the House or Senate to
unilaterally reverse the Attorney General’s decision to suspend deportation proceedings against an undocumented person. The Court held this legislative veto
unconstitutional: Congress may not delegate to itself a decision-making role
outside of the one prescribed in Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution, regardless whether the single house of Congress exercising the veto is constrained by
an intelligible principle furnished in the authorizing legislation. In dissent, Justice White expressed frustration at the abrupt imposition of a rule-like limitation on congressional delegations. All congressional delegations, Justice White
insisted, should be evaluated pursuant to the Court’s general “intelligible principle” standard. Justice White posited the legislative veto as simply a reﬂection
of a limited delegation of lawmaking power and a concession to practical administrative needs: “If the effective functioning of a complex modern government requires the delegation of vast authority which, by virtue of its breadth, is
legislative or ‘quasi-legislative’ in character, I cannot accept that Art[icle]
I . . . should forbid Congress from qualifying that grant with a legislative veto.”42
Second, in the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 (LIVA),43 Congress delegated to
the President authority to cancel or nullify certain provisions of appropriations
bills within ﬁve days of his signing those bills into law. Wielding that authority, President Clinton canceled a provision of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997
and a provision of the Taxpayers Relief Act of 1997. In Clinton v. City of New
York, the Court invalidated LIVA, holding that Congress lacked authority to
delegate cancellation power to the President.44 As in Chadha, the Clinton ruling
did not turn on whether the delegation contained an intelligible principle,
which the Act indeed seemed to provide.45 Instead, the Court imposed a
bright-line rule: delegations to the executive, however precise, may not involve
formal revisions to acts of Congress.46
The Clinton Court’s imposition of a bright-line rule invoked a sharp dissent
from Justice Scalia. From Justice Scalia’s perspective, LIVA’s delegation was indistinguishable from an ordinary delegation of lawmaking authority. He conceded that it was possible to read the Constitution to admit no delegations of

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
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Id. at 989 (White, J., dissenting).
Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996).
524 U.S. 417, 448 (1998).
Id. at 436 (describing narrow statutory conditions under which cancellations were permissible).
Id. at 438-40.
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lawmaking power but cautioned that the Court had never hewed to such a
reading of the Constitution. Instead, Justice Scalia homed in on the bright-line
distinction, implicit in the Clinton majority’s ruling, between “cancelling” legislative provisions and furthering legislative provisions through rulemaking. He
insisted that the Constitution “no more categorically prohibits the Executive
reduction of congressional dispositions in the course of implementing statutes
that authorize such reduction, than it categorically prohibits the Executive
augmentation of congressional dispositions in the course of implementing
statutes that authorize such augmentation—generally known as substantive
rulemaking.”47
We appreciate that the Court in neither Clinton nor Chadha would classify
its holding as a modiﬁcation of the nondelegation doctrine. Only the dissenting
Justices, who emphasized the doctrine’s openness to unforeseen pragmatic considerations, would. But that is precisely our point. The nondelegation doctrine
is more dynamic than generally appreciated. Clinton and Chadha alike conjured
new and unexpected limitations. They drew bright-line rules carving out narrow exceptions limiting the application of the still-capacious intelligible principle standard that applies liberally when the delegation is to a bona ﬁde administrative agency.48 Whether Clinton and Chadha’s results are justiﬁed or not, our
core point here is that they, like Schechter’s private delegation doctrine, illustrate
how a broad standard that seems to cover the waterfront of delegation jurisprudence can prove amenable over time to rule-based limitations.
B. The Removal Power
Our second example concerns the separation-of-powers controversy over
who controls top-ranking agency officials. The key question in these cases is
whether the President must have complete and unfettered authority to remove
agency officials, consistent with her duty to take care that the laws are faithfully
executed.49 Evidence from the Founding period is mixed. The Constitution
vests in the President the power to appoint principal officers of the United
States,50 but is silent on the question of subsequent forms of control. Madison
suggested that the power to unilaterally remove officers was an inherent element of Article II’s grant of executive power and the President’s corresponding

47.

Id. at 464-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (citing J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co.
v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).
49. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5.
50. See id. § 2, cl. 2.
48.
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duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.51 The Court in Marbury v.
Madison seemingly acknowledged as much, at the same time conceding that
Congress may at times restrict that unilateral presidential power.52
In the twentieth century, with the rise of the administrative state, questions
of control over executive personnel took on greater importance. The modern
jurisprudence on agency control is complex, characterized by oscillations akin
to those observed in the nondelegation domain. We start with the bright-line
rule announced in Myers v. United States.53 In Myers, the Court rejected congressionally imposed limitations on the removal of postal officials and announced
what seemed like a comprehensive and categorical rule. Explaining that the
power to remove officials “is an incident of the power to appoint them,”54 the
Court insisted that complete presidential control was necessary for the Chief
Executive to “properly supervise and guide [officials’] construction of the statutes under which they act in order to secure that unitary and uniform execution
of the laws which Article II of the Constitution evidently contemplated in vesting general executive power in the President alone.”55
The seeming absolutism of Myers yielded in short order to a softer-edged
standard. Just a decade after deciding the postal removal case, the Court in
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States56 rejected Myers’s rule as overbroad. In its
place, the Court substituted an open-textured standard for identifying classes
of officials Congress could insulate from summary presidential removal.
Humphrey had been one of the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) Commissioners, a carryover from the Coolidge and Hoover administrations that President Franklin D. Roosevelt was eager to dismiss.57 After Humphrey’s death, his
executor challenged the termination as inconsistent with the statutory protections Congress afforded commissioners, which limited the grounds for removal
to “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”58 The Court held that
some agency officials need not fall under the President’s unfettered control. If
those officials’ responsibilities are “quasi-legislative” or “quasi-judicial,” the
Court opined, Congress may restrict the President’s removal powers by requir-

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
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See, e.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 102-04 (3d ed. 1948).
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162 (1803).
272 U.S. 52 (1926).
Id. at 161.
Id. at 135.
295 U.S. 602 (1935).
Id. at 618-19; see also THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 151 (1984).
Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 620 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1934)).
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ing a showing of good cause.59 Hence, a presidential power framed in Myers as
categorical and rule-like was transformed into a standard that would require a
searching and fact-sensitive ex post inquiry. Demonstrating the difficulty of applying this standard, later courts questioned whether the Humphrey’s Executor
Court was even right on its facts given the FTC’s extensive executive responsibilities.60
Cases challenging the constitutionality of removal provisions occur infrequently. A subsequent pair in 1958 and 1986 followed Humphrey’s Executor and
involved the Court investigating whether a terminated official’s responsibilities
were primarily executive, judicial, or legislative.61 In 1988, however, the Court
again changed tack. Rather than sliding back to a rule, it instead pushed even
further in the direction of an open-ended standard. In Morrison v. Olson,62 a
case concerning whether Congress could insulate a special prosecutor from removal by the Attorney General absent good cause, the Court disavowed
Humphrey’s Executor. Morrison insisted that the Humphrey’s Executor standard
was too unreliable and, perhaps, too rigid.63 Instead the Court fashioned a new,
arguably muddier standard that obligated courts to determine “whether the
removal restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the President’s ability
to perform his constitutional duty.”64
Dissenting in Morrison, Justice Scalia lamented the long-abandoned brightline rule of Myers.65 “The Court,” Justice Scalia bemoaned, “has . . . replaced the
clear constitutional prescription that the executive power belongs to the President with a ‘balancing test.’ What are the standards to determine how the bal59.
60.
61.

62.
63.

64.
65.

Id. at 625-26.
See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689 n.28 (1988) (citing Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,
761 n.3 (1986) (White, J., dissenting)).
See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 732-34 (determining that the Comptroller General has executive duties and thus he or she could not be an official who serves at the pleasure of Congress);
Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1958) (imposing a for-cause restriction on
presidential control of War Claims Commissioners after determining that the Commission
was an “adjudicating body”).
487 U.S. 654.
See id. at 689-90 (“We undoubtedly did rely on the terms ‘quasi-legislative’ and ‘quasijudicial’ to distinguish the officials involved in Humphrey’s Executor . . . from those in Myers, but our present considered view is that the determination of whether the Constitution
allows Congress to impose a ‘good cause’-type restriction on the President’s power to remove an official cannot be made to turn on whether or not that official is classiﬁed as ‘purely
executive.’ The analysis contained in our removal cases is designed not to deﬁne rigid categories of those officials who may or may not be removed at will by the President . . . .”).
Id. at 691.
Id. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ance is to be struck, that is, how much removal of presidential power is too
much?”66
The Court would effectively repudiate one element of Morrison concerning
appointments in 1997,67 but Justice Scalia would have to wait twenty-odd years
for the return of a bright-line rule to the Court’s removal jurisprudence. In Free
Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board68 (PCAOB), the Court
confronted an administrative regime where a double layer of political insulation
immunized the titular Board from direct presidential control. Commissioners
of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) were understood to be subject to presidential removal only for cause. Similarly, PCAOB members could
be removed by the SEC Commissioners only by a showing even greater than
the typical cause.69 The Court could have applied the Morrison standard and assessed whether this dual limitation on full presidential control impeded the
President’s ability to perform his constitutional duties, ﬁnding that this particular set of limitations represented too great a restriction. Instead, the Court
without warning pivoted to a new bright-line rule. Repeatedly insisting that
two layers of for-cause insulation from presidential control present concerns
qualitatively different from one layer of insulation, the Court held that two layers were per se unconstitutional70—adopting what seems for the moment to be
a rule-like carve-out from the Morrison standard, at least in special cases of
double insulation. Whether Free Enterprise Fund’s new rule will be extended
remains to be seen.
C. Deference to Agency Legal Interpretations
A third line of cases implicating separation-of-powers questions concerns
the deference afforded to administrative agencies’ statutory interpretations.
Lest there be any doubt, the degree to which courts cede interpretative authority is very much a matter of interbranch relations. The Court has construed deference in terms of Congress delegating interpretive legal authority to agencies

66.

Id. at 711.
See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662-66 (1997).
68. 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
69. The Commissioners would have to ﬁnd that a “Board member (a) ha[d] willfully violated
any provision of the [Sarbanes-Oxley] Act, the rules of the Board, or the securities laws, (b)
ha[d] willfully abused the authority of that member; or (c) . . . ha[d] failed to enforce compliance with any such provision or rule, or any professional standard” without a reasonable
justiﬁcation for not acting. Id. at 486 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 7217 (d)(3)).
70. See id. at 484.
67.
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as opposed to judges.71 Because the scope of such interpretive authority helps
determine agencies’ policymaking power, it has become a heavily litigated battleground for separation-of-powers disputes.
We start with Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,72 a 1944 dispute about whether private ﬁreﬁghters at a meatpacking plant qualiﬁed for overtime pay while on call
to battle potential ﬁres. Skidmore turned partially on how much deference the
Court would give to the Labor Department officials’ interpretation of the relevant overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Court held that
the Department’s interpretation was “entitled to respect.”73 The Court explained that the weight given to an agency’s judgment “in a particular case will
depend upon the thoroughness evident in [the agency’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements,
and all those factors which give it power to persuade.”74 In other words, the
Court used a standard encompassing a heterogeneous array of pragmatic considerations to measure the deference owed to agency interpretations.
Forty years later, the Court expressly reoriented its deference jurisprudence
in a more rule-like direction. In its landmark decision in Chevron v. National Resources Defense Council, the Court held that whenever statutes authorizing agency action are vague, agency interpretations of those statutes are valid provided
they constitute a permissible construction of the statutory text.75 The permissibility of Chevron’s formulation might suggest a continued devotion to standards. But Chevron abandoned the plethora of factors used by a generation of
lawyers, judges, and policymakers working under Skidmore. Under Chevron,
the interpretive deference given to agencies no longer depended on a searching,
case-speciﬁc analysis. Instead, only one fact mattered: whether the relevant
statute is ambiguous. If so, agencies are automatically entitled to deference.
71.

72.
73.
74.
75.

See, e.g., Michaels, supra note 16, at 565-66 (explaining why Skidmore and Chevron are separation-of-powers cases); see also Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 495 (2010) (“The Court [in Chevron] appears
to have been inﬂuenced both by separation of powers and institutional competency concerns
about the appropriate judicial role . . . .”). Some jurists have recently expressed discomfort
with the existing deference regime. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712-14 (2015)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (questioning Chevron deference on separation-of-powers
grounds); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, No. 14-9585, slip op. at 12 (10th Cir. Aug. 23,
2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring), http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/14/14-9585.pdf
[http://perma.cc/C9LE-KCYB] (similar). Whether this is a passing or durable phenomenon is not possible to determine at the time of this writing.
323 U.S. 134 (1944).
Id. at 140.
Id.
467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
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Chevron is thus fairly characterized as a rule in our terminology. Nevertheless, it enlarged the space (in a categorical fashion) for discretionary action by
regulated actors. At the same time, Chevron also implicitly assigned to the
courts considerable discretion in deciding how to interpret whether a statute is
indeed ambiguous.76 The Court did not impose any stable “ranking” of canons
or other interpretive presumptions, leaving later benches to select between diverse approaches to statutory interpretation.77 As a result of this diversity of interpretive approaches at what is often called Step One, Chevron’s one-type-ofdeference rule (which, again, applies only once courts ﬁnd a statute to be ambiguous) may “not necessarily yield greater predictability and law-like behavior
among judges than context-saturated standards.”78 Hence, notwithstanding its
rule-like formulation, Chevron still enables a measure of cycling between different approaches to statutory interpretation.
Despite this elasticity, the sharper, one-type-of-deference rule installed in
Chevron soon morphed into a compound, rule-standard analysis. The leading
case here is the 2001 decision United States v. Mead Corp.79 Mead held that when
agencies acted with the “force of law,” the Court would accord them Chevron
deference.80 Otherwise, agencies likely merit only Skidmore deference.81 Mead
thus contains a complex intermingling of rule-like and standard-like features.
After Mead, agencies engaging in notice-and-comment rulemaking or in formal
adjudications would be presumed to have acted with the force of law and
would continue to receive Chevron deference.82 Those that employed more in-

76.

77.
78.

79.
80.
81.
82.
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See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 131-61 (2000) (using a
broad set of interpretive tools to determine whether a statute is ambiguous); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 453-54 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (objecting to the Court’s decision to go beyond the “plain meaning and . . . the structure of the Act” and to additionally
draw upon the “traditional tools of statutory construction” when assessing the ambiguity of
said act (internal quotation marks omitted)).
See Abbe R. Gluck, What 30 Years of Chevron Teach Us About the Rest of Statutory Interpretation, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 607, 614 (2014).
Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727, 1727
(2010); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO.
L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008) (“[T]he Court [has] employed a continuum of deference regimes . . . [that are] more complicated than the literature or even the Court’s own opinions
suggest . . . .”).
533 U.S. 218 (2001).
Id. at 226-27.
See id. at 227.
See id. at 229-30.
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formal decisional processes are now apt to receive only the lesser, more openended Skidmore deference, wherein the measure of such deference turns on
some gestalt-like computation of the plural Skidmore factors.83 Adding complexity and uncertainty to the deference regime, those factors have since multiplied, as later cases, notably Barnhart v. Walton,84 have added to the list of considerations relevant to the application of the Mead/Skidmore standard. In effect,
the oscillation from Skidmore to Chevron to the Mead mid-point suggests that
we now ﬁnd ourselves in a hybrid rule-standard world—with courts employing
rules or standards based on the types of procedures agencies use.
D. Adjudication by Non-Article III Judges: The Bankruptcy Example
Notwithstanding Congress’s wide power to create federal courts, the national legislature has created any number of alternative adjudicative offices
lacking the lifetime tenure and salary protections of traditional Article III appointments.85 These alternative tribunals include territorial courts, military
courts, bankruptcy courts, tax courts, and a bewildering array of different
agency adjudicators, including immigration and Social Security courts.86
Among this varied contingent of non-Article III adjudicators are more than
1,500 administrative law judges (ALJs) working across more than twenty-ﬁve
agencies.87 ALJs outnumber Article III judges almost two-to-one,88 and decide

83.

84.
85.
86.

87.
88.

Id. at 235 (enumerating “[t]he merit of [the rule’s] writer’s thoroughness, logic, and expertness, [the rule’s] ﬁt with prior interpretations, and any other sources of weight” as possible
determinants for how much respect an agency interpretation obtains under Skidmore).
535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) (announcing a list of factors for calibrating deference that partly
overlap with those announced in Mead and partly go beyond the Mead/Skidmore factors).
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (vesting Congress with the power to create federal courts and
establishing both tenure and salary protections for Article III judges).
For a partial listing of non-Article III tribunals, see Jaime Dodge, Reconceptualizing NonArticle III Tribunals, 99 MINN. L. REV. 905, 913-14 (2015). For historical scholarship that explores their constitutional credentials and development, see Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the
Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559 (2007); and Gordon G. Young, Public Rights and
the Federal Judicial Power: From Murray’s Lessee Through Crowell to Schor, 35 BUFF. L. REV.
765 (1986).
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 542-43 (2010) (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
Compare id. (“[T]he Federal Government relies on 1,584 ALJs to adjudicate administrative
matters in over 25 agencies.”), with U.S. Federal Courts–Total Judicial Officers in the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, District Courts, and Bankruptcy Courts–as of June 30, 1990 and September 30,
1995, 2000, 2005, and 2011 Through 2015, U.S. COURTS (2015), http://www.uscourts.gov
/statistics/table/11/judicial-facts-and-ﬁgures/2015/09/30 [http://perma.cc/NUV5-C9C4]
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more than 250,000 cases a year.89 The 372 bankruptcy judges90 are another important group to whom Congress grants front-line adjudicative responsibilities, albeit under the supervision of federal district court judges.91 ALJs and
bankruptcy judges alike decide matters of large ﬁnancial and personal signiﬁcance.
Non-Article III adjudication has generated two related, but not wholly consistent, lines of precedent. One is characterized by cycling between rules and
standards, while the other evinces marked stability. In brief, the Article III
treatment of administrative agency adjudication has remained remarkably stable
and conciliatory for more than 125 years. By contrast, the Court’s treatment of
bankruptcy courts has oscillated wildly between restrictive rules and enabling
standards. Scholars have puzzled over the divergent treatment of agency and
bankruptcy adjudication.92 But that concern is secondary to our point here:
that cycling is an important feature of bankruptcy jurisprudence. We focus on
the latter here, holding off on the jurisprudence of agency adjudication until
Section I.F, the Section devoted to doctrinal lines that do not exhibit rulesstandards cycling.
Bankruptcy courts might seem to be a minor separation-of-powers problem. They operate under the supervision of Article III judges, not within executive departments. And they have a long historical pedigree: English bankruptcy
practice, with which the Framers were well acquainted, allocated front-line adjudicative responsibilities to non-judicial commissioners.93 Nevertheless, the
Court’s treatment of bankruptcy judges has cycled twice during the twentieth
century, with a majority of Justices seemingly pivoting erratically from loose
standard to rigid rule, reinstalling the rule after a period of inattention by the
Supreme Court, and then ﬁnally relaxing somewhat, settling on another standard to assess constitutionality. The ensuing pattern, such as it is, does not lend
itself to easy explanation, such as judicial turnover at One First Street.

89.
90.
91.

92.

93.
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(reporting 179 authorized courts of appeal seats and 677 authorized district court seats in
2015).
See Kent Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, 66 VAND. L. REV. 797, 799 (2013).
See Ralph R. Mabey, The Evolving Bankruptcy Bench: How Are the “Units” Faring?, 47 B.C. L.
REV. 105, 106 (2005).
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 152(a)(1), 157(a)-(b)(1) (2012) (authorizing bankruptcy judges, on reference by a federal district court judge, to “hear and determine all cases under title 11 and all
core proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11”).
See Anthony J. Casey & Aziz Z. Huq, The Article III Problem in Bankruptcy, 82 U. CHI. L. REV.
1155, 1187 (2015); Rafael I. Pardo & Kathryn A. Watts, The Structural Exceptionalism of Bankruptcy Administration, 60 UCLA L. REV. 384, 417-18 (2012).
See Casey & Huq, supra note 92, at 1167-71.
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The ﬁrst separation-of-powers challenge to non-Article III bankruptcy
judges arose under an 1898 Act of Congress.94 This statutory scheme drew a
fuzzy distinction between “summary” jurisdiction over matters related to the
estate (which bankruptcy judges actually or constructively possessed) and
“plenary” jurisdiction over other matters (which they lacked).95 The distinction’s fuzziness meant that it fell to the federal courts to deﬁne bankruptcy
courts’ powers.96 The Court initially applied a ﬂexible standard that accommodated a range of policy interests, including ones seemingly unforeseen by the
enacting Congress. For example, in the 1966 case of Katchen v. Landy, the
Court considered bankruptcy judges’ authority to designate creditors’ claims
against an estate as voidable preferences, payments made in anticipation of
bankruptcy to avoid its distribution rule.97 Voidable preferences might be understood to be unrelated to the state given that they by deﬁnition involve a preﬁling transfer to a third party. At least at ﬁrst blush, they thus seem to fall outside a bankruptcy judge’s summary jurisdiction. Moreover, while the Katchen
petitioners did not argue that Article III had been violated, they did press a
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, in effect claiming that Congress
would have assigned the matter to the wrong branch if voidable preferences
could be resolved by a non-Article III official.98 Resisting that inﬂexible and
rule-like logic, the Court emphasized cost and administrability considerations
in concluding that bankruptcy judges could decide preference claims even
though the petitioners lacked actual or constructive possession of the property
in question.99 The Court thus treated the 1898 statute’s apparent limit on bankruptcy judges’ authority as a standard rather than a rule, invoking consequentialist considerations to stretch that authority as circumstances warranted.

94.

95.
96.

97.
98.
99.

An Act to Establish a Uniform System of Bankruptcy Throughout the United States, ch. 541,
30 Stat. 544 (1898), amended by Chandler Act (Bankruptcy Act, Amendments of 1938), ch.
575, 52 Stat. 840, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat.
2549.
Weidhorn v. Levy, 253 U.S. 268, 273-74 (1920) (discussing this statutory distinction); see also
Casey & Huq, supra note 92, at 1171-72 (same).
For examples of the sort of knotty jurisprudence this yielded because of uncertainty as to the
scope of the estate, see, for example, Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264 U.S. 426, 430-34
(1924); and Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1902).
382 U.S. 323, 329-30 (1966). For a deﬁnition of voidable preferences, see Stern v. Marshall,
131 S. Ct. 2594, 2616 (2011).
Katchen, 382 U.S. at 339.
Id. (citing concerns about “delay and expense” as a justiﬁcation for denying the Seventh
Amendment challenge).
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Yet when later reconsidering the constitutional bounds of bankruptcy
courts’ power in light of new legislation, the Court applied a rigid rule with no
allowance for the forward-looking, practical concerns Katchen endorsed. In
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., a plurality of the
Court invalidated provisions of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act allocating
bankruptcy judges power to decide all matters “related to” a bankruptcy case.100
Writing for four Justices, Justice Brennan insisted that Article III adjudication
could be ousted in only three “historically and constitutionally . . . exceptional”
pockets: territorial courts, military courts, and the adjudication of “public
rights” cases (i.e., suits between the government and its citizens).101 Justice
Brennan distinguished “the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations, which is
at the core of the federal bankruptcy power,” from the “adjudication of statecreated private rights,” which fall outside that power.102 The Court used this
rule-like distinction to invalidate the 1978 jurisdictional provisions in toto.103
Thirty years later, the Court once again revisited the separation-of-powers
question in the bankruptcy court context. The Justices were confronted with
Congress’s answer to Northern Pipeline. This answer, part of the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, was structured around a list
of sixteen “core” matters within bankruptcy judges’ reach.104 In the interim, the
relevant Article III regime for bankruptcy remained rule-like, even as the Court
continued to issue standard-based decisions regarding agency adjudication.105
One might have read these latter agency adjudication cases to presage an impending shift from rules to standards in the bankruptcy context too. After all,
as noted above, both sets of cases involve the extension of adjudicatory responsibilities to non-Article III tribunals. Alternatively, we might characterize this
era as one where the Northern Pipeline rule was, in practice, ignored, as bankruptcy judges went unmolested as they continued creatively interpreting the
sixteen expansive new statutory fonts of power in light of practical considerations and policy imperatives.106

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
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458 U.S. 50, 76 (1982) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 64-68.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 88 (staying the judgment for three months to give Congress time to react).
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
§ 157(b)(1), (c)(1), 98 Stat. 333, 340-41; id. § 157(b)(2) (listing sixteen “core” matters).
See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 854-56 (1986);
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 583-93 (1985).
Indeed, the sixteen categories enumerated in the 1984 Act were so broad and diffuse that
they could “easily” have reached the action in Northern Pipeline. Ralph Brubaker, A “Sum-
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When the Court did return to the separation-of-powers question raised by
bankruptcy courts, it reaffirmed its commitment to rigid rules foreclosing experimentation or new considerations. Thus, in Stern v. Marshall,107 the Court
held that the statutory category assigned to bankruptcy judges of “counterclaims by the estate against persons ﬁling claims against the estate”108 violated
Article III.109 Reaching back to the category of “public rights” employed in
Northern Pipeline, the Stern Court deﬁned the permissible scope of bankruptcy
judges’ power as reaching only issues “integral to the restructuring of the debtor-creditor relationship.”110 On its face, this test might be read as a standard,
inviting consideration of new factors, but the Stern Court seemingly rejected
any such reading as it deployed the test as a rule to narrow bankruptcy judges’
power. Stern hence retained, and even doubled down on, the Northern Pipeline
approach.
Perhaps more surprisingly, Stern’s rule did not endure. Just three years later, and in the absence of any change in the Court’s personnel, the same nine
Justices who decided Stern cycled back to a more standard-like articulation. In
Executive Beneﬁts Insurance Agency v. Arkison, a unanimous Court held that any
constitutional troubles regarding the assignment of adjudicatory responsibilities over bankruptcy could be “cured” if the bankruptcy judge’s ruling was
treated as proposed ﬁndings of facts and legal conclusions, to be evaluated de
novo by a district court.111 A year later, a six-Justice majority in Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif found litigant consent sufficient to vest the
bankruptcy courts with power to enter a ﬁnal judgment.112 Without abjuring
Stern, the Court in Wellness International reached across domains, citing and
centrally relying on precedent from the agency adjudication context that, as
noted above, employed a much more ﬂexible standard.113 Rather than applying

107.
108.
109.

110.

111.
112.
113.

mary” Statutory and Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy Judges’ Core Jurisdiction After Stern v.
Marshall, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 121, 136-37 (2012).
131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) (2012).
Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2609 (“Article III protects liberty not only through its role in implementing the separation of powers, but also by specifying the deﬁning characteristics of Article III
judges.”).
Id. at 2628 (quoting Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42, 44 (1990) (per curiam)). Somewhat
confusingly, the Stern Court also employs a different terminology, speaking of “whether the
action at issue stems from the bankruptcy itself or would necessarily be resolved in the
claims allowance process.” Id. at 2618.
134 S. Ct. 2165, 2175 (2014).
135 S. Ct. 1932, 1942 & n.7 (2015).
Id. at 1942-43.
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an unbending rule, the Wellness International Court engaged in open-ended
consideration of the “practical” consequences of its decision.114 The separationof-powers regime in bankruptcy, in short, is well on its way back to the standard that produced Katchen in 1966.
As suggested above, the shifts documented above do not obviously correlate with ideological changes in the Court nor with clear shifts in jurisprudential methodologies. To the contrary, it is striking that Justice Brennan, a jurist
rarely seen as an arch-formalist, penned the leading rule-like decision in Northern Pipeline. At this moment, moreover, Article III jurisprudence seems to be
transitioning from rules to standards and drawing connections between agency
adjudicators and bankruptcy judges despite the stability of the Court’s personnel and the historically separate treatment of those two doctrinal lines.
E. Foreign Affairs and National Security
The ﬁnal separation-of-powers domain that cycles between rules and
standards concerns foreign affairs. In the four contexts canvassed so far, it is
the Court’s rule of decision that is the cycling pivot. In the foreign affairs domain, by contrast, the crucial rule of decision has remained largely stable.
Echoing dynamics observed in the Chevron context, cycling instead occurs in
the application of that rule. In these cases, the modal question—deﬁned most
famously by Justice Robert Jackson’s path-making opinion in Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer115—is whether Congress prohibits or allows the presidential actions in question. The balance of interbranch powers, therefore, largely
depends on how the Court measures the scope of congressional permission.
Patterns of rules-standards cycling surface here in the context of statutory
interpretation, rather than in the crafting of constitutional rules. Speciﬁcally,
the Court sometimes reads an act of Congress as a sharp-edged rule, marking a
clear delineation of what forms of executive initiative the legislature does and
does not support. At other times, the Court glosses relevant statutory text as a
malleable standard capable of accommodating novel and capacious considerations of congressional intent. When the Court treats the relevant statute as a
standard, the executive is more likely to ﬁnd supportive legal authority. The re-

114.

Id. at 1944 (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851
(1986)).
115. 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Black’s less inﬂuential plurality
opinion also viewed the presence of statutory authority as dispositive. Id. at 585 (plurality
opinion) (“The President’s power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of
Congress or from the Constitution itself.”).
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sult, as in the lines of cases canvassed above, is a series of wide ﬂuctuations in
the stringency of separation-of-powers limitations.
Under Justice Jackson’s inﬂuential three-part typology, Presidents have
“maximum” authority when acting “pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress”;116 uncertain authority when “ac[ting] in absence of either
a congressional grant or denial of authority”;117 and their “lowest ebb” of authority when “tak[ing] measures incompatible with the expressed or implied
will of Congress.”118 This framework might be understood as susceptible to a
range of more or less pro-legislative readings. Subsequent courts, however,
have not explicitly read Youngstown to invite context-speciﬁc judgments about
interbranch balance, but have rather treated the Jackson approach as a general
framework for the analysis of separation-of-powers questions.119 More conventionally, what is perhaps the Court’s most famous concurrence represents a
theory of constitutionalism channeled through interpretative construction of
congressional enactments. But like the Chevron opinion discussed above, it is
silent on how courts interpret statutes.120 For its part, Congress has proved
(perhaps unsurprisingly) incapable of consistently writing statutes that are resistant to diverse, even inconsistent, readings.
Applying the Youngstown framework to a range of ambiguous statutes, the
Court has alternated between rule-like and standard-like readings of the relevant statutes. Evaluating President Truman’s seizure of the steel mills in the
Youngstown case itself, a plurality of the Court read legislation concerning the
resolution of labor disputes narrowly as a set of speciﬁc, rule-like permissions
for presidential intervention that did not include the mass seizure of facilities at

116.

Id. at 635.
Id. at 637.
118. Id.
119. For examples of the invocation of the Jackson Youngstown opinion as a general rule of decision for a diverse array of separation-of-powers disputes, see Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v.
Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2095 (2015), which employs Justice Jackson’s framework to analyze
presidential power to recognize foreign states; and Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,
433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977), which applies Justice Jackson’s view that the separation of powers
“were not intended to operate with absolute independence” to a mandatory statutory
framework for the preservation of presidential records. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683, 707 (1974).
120. Kevin M. Stack, The Statutory President, 90 IOWA L. REV. 539, 558 (2005) (“Justice Jackson’s
opinion is silent on the question of how to judge whether a presidential act ﬁts within the
scope of an express or implied statutory authorization.”); see also Neil Kinkopf, The Statutory
Commander in Chief, 81 IND. L.J. 1169, 1175 (2006) (discussing the difficulty raised by Justice
Jackson’s silence given that “[i]t will be the rare circumstance indeed where Congress has actually been silent,” although its statements will often be “ambiguous”).
117.
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issue in that case. Indeed, Justice Black’s plurality opinion emphasized a negative inference drawn from the Congress’s failure to enact authorization of the
sort that could justify such a seizure.121
The Court’s willingness to read enabling statutes as rules, however, did not
endure. Three decades later, when the Court next confronted an arguably unilateral presidential intervention in the wake of the Iran hostage crisis, the Court
read the relevant statutes loosely. Then-Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Dames &
Moore v. Regan acknowledged the absence of precise statutory authority for
such executive conduct,122 which had damned President Truman some thirty
years before. In a novel interpretive move, however, the Court then eschewed
attention to any single statute and refused to draw any negative inference from
the absence of express statutory authority. It instead directed attention to “the
general tenor of Congress’ legislation in this area.”123 That is, the Court adopted an interpretive strategy that a majority of Justices in Youngstown had rejected. The more general body of relevant statutes passed by Congress granting the
President emergency economic powers, coupled with Congress’s inability to
“anticipate and legislate with regard to every possible action” the President
might take, resulted in the executive having “broad discretion” to determine
what steps were necessary to address novel international situations.124 More
prosaically stated, the Court read the relevant statutes as a standard.125 More
than twenty years later, a plurality of the Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld would use
the latitudinarian approach of Dames & Moore to ﬁnd detention authority in a
tersely worded authorization of military force that made no mention of anything approximating detention.126
Yet the pivot to standards was neither stable nor consistent. In a pair of cases decided soon after Hamdi, the Court read enabling legislation narrowly as
rule-like authorizations. These cases are instructive because of the ideologically
divergent coalitions of Justices in the majorities of each. In the ﬁrst of the two
cases, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Court invalidated the military commissions established by President George W. Bush at Guantanamo Bay because they failed
121.
122.

123.
124.
125.
126.
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Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 586 (plurality opinion) (drawing a negative inference from proposed
amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act that were rejected in 1947).
453 U.S. 654, 675-77 (1981) (ﬁnding express statutory authority for the nulliﬁcation of attachments and the transfer of Iranian agreements pursuant to the President’s emergency
economic powers, but ﬁnding no express authority to suspend claims pending in U.S.
courts).
Id. at 678.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 30 (discussing Kaplow’s deﬁnition of standards).
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517-19 (2004) (plurality opinion).
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to comply with, among other things, Article 36(b) of the congressionally enacted Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).127 Article 36(b) demanded that
military commission and court-martial procedures “be uniform insofar as practicable.”128 The Hamdan judgment rested on the fact that the President had determined that Article III trials were not practical, but had not officially made
the same determination about courts-martial.129 Under the circumstances of
the case, it was tolerably clear that such a judgment was at least implicit in the
President’s order. The Court’s demand for speciﬁc compliance instead reﬂected
its view of the UCMJ as a precise rule, setting forth ex ante particularized
forms of compliance rather than inviting ex post application of a general standard.
Two years later in Medellín v. Texas, a different coalition of Justices similarly
read the United States’ agreement to treaties establishing the International
Court of Justice as precise and exhaustive of presidential authority.130 Chief
Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court in Medellín, to be sure, rested on a general rule that treaties are presumptively non-self-executing.131 This presumption, however, treats treaty text in a precise, rule-like fashion, rather than as a
more open-ended standard. The majority framed the question presented in
Medellín in terms of whether “explicit” textual authority existed.132 The dissent,
in contrast, would have allowed a more latitudinarian approach to the text.133
Hamdan and Medellín are typically viewed as cases at ideological poles.134 But

127.
128.
129.
130.

131.
132.
133.

134.

548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006) (invalidating Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain NonCitizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001)).
Id. at 620 (quoting Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 36(b), 10 U.S.C. § 836(b)
(2000)).
Id. at 623.
552 U.S. 491, 513 (2008) (holding that “[t]he pertinent international agreements, therefore,
do not provide for implementation of ICJ judgments through direct enforcement in domestic courts”).
Id. at 505-06 (discussing precedent on treaty self-execution).
Id. at 514 (“The interpretive approach employed by the Court today—resorting to the text—
is hardly novel.”).
Id. at 549 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The provision’s text matters very much . . . . But that is
not because it contains language that explicitly refers to self-execution. For reasons I have already explained . . . one should not expect that kind of textual statement.”).
For an example of scholarship in these pages that is highly critical of Hamdan while endorsing Medellín, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional Power To Interpret International
Law, 118 YALE L.J. 1762, 1777 n.41, 1835 (2009). Anticipating our analysis, Harlan Cohen
fairly describes both opinions as exercises in “formalism.” Harlan Grant Cohen, Formalism
and Distrust: Foreign Affairs Law in the Roberts Court, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 380, 384-85
(2015).
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they share methodological common ground in their reliance on rules over
standards vis-à-vis statutory construction.
These contexts are not the only ones where we see cycling in foreign affairs
law. In cases concerning the preemptive effects of federal immigration law on
state regulation, for example, the Court has also switched between standardlike ﬁeld preemption135 and narrower, rule-like conﬂict preemption.136 More
generally, along a longer timeline the Court has alternated between exclusive,
rule-like and broad, standard-like readings of the President’s foreign affairs
powers. In a pair of cases challenging President Roosevelt’s 1933 agreement
with the Soviet Union, the Court thus relied on a “powerful presumption in favor of federal executive action” even absent either statutory authority or clear
justiﬁcation in the constitutional text.137 A decade later, in Youngstown itself, a
plurality of the Court declined to infer additional presidential authority beyond
Article II’s enumeration.138 Subsequently, the Court proved more willing to infer nonstatutory presidential authority to oust state law that impinged on the
President’s foreign policy efforts.139 Most recently, the Court in Zivotofsky ex rel.
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, determined that it is the “exclusive prerogative of the Execu-

135.

136.

137.
138.

139.
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See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 72-74 (1941) (ﬁnding a Pennsylvania alien registration
law preempted because Congress intended to occupy the ﬁeld via a “single integrated and
all-embracing system” for regulating naturalization).
See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976) (declining to ﬁnd a California law that regulated noncitizen employment preempted in the absence of a “clear and manifest purpose of
Congress” (quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146 (1963))).
This cycle of standards to rules within preemption has also repeated itself. Compare Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 608 (2011) (employing rule-like conﬂict preemption), with Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502 (2012) (employing standard-like
ﬁeld preemption); see also Daniel Abebe & Aziz Z. Huq, Foreign Affairs Federalism: A Revisionist Approach, 66 VAND. L. REV. 723, 734-36 (2013) (describing the Court’s “oscillating positions” in immigration federalism cases).
Abebe & Huq, supra note 136, at 736-37 (discussing United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203
(1942); and United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937)).
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952) (plurality opinion) (“The
President’s power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of Congress or
from the Constitution itself.”).
Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413-17 (2003) (invalidating California insurance
statute based on the President’s “independent authority”). An earlier case, Crosby v. National
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 368, 375 (2000), invalidated a Massachusetts law imposing sanctions on Burma on the ground that it interfered with statutorily created presidential
discretion. The Crosby Court, however, also invoked the Jackson framework in Youngstown in
a way that makes plain that the Massachusetts law is problematic also because it infringes on
a domain of presidential authority. Id. at 381-85.
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tive” to “recognize a foreign state and its territorial bounds,” a prerogative that
“resides in the President alone.”140
Again, ideology provides no organizing principle for the observed movement between standards and rules in foreign affairs cases. So-called liberal Justices rely on both rules (Hamdan, Youngstown) and standards (Zivotofsky). Similarly, holdings labeled conservative are just as likely to be grounded on
standards (Dames & Moore) as rules (Medellín). What is consistent is not the
alignment between one ideological side of the Court with one sort of legal
norm, but rather the ﬂuid movement back and forth between the two kinds of
norms.
F. The Cycles of Separation-of-Powers Law: A Summary
Rules-standards cycling occurs across a varied separation-of-powers terrain. The doctrinal changes identiﬁed here are diverse. Some involve a sudden,
conscious shift from rules to standards (or vice versa) that expressly rejects a
prior methodological approach. Such about-faces are surprisingly rare, but include Northern Pipeline.141 More commonly the Court creates a carve-out by
nesting a rule within a standard or layering a standard on top of a rule. Nondelegation cases, including Schechter, Chadha, and Clinton, thus impose rules
that limit the relevance of the broad “intelligible principle” standard,142 while
Free Enterprise Fund, a removal case, carves out a rule limiting the applicability
of the broad standard announced in Morrison.143 Alternatively, the Court recalibrates by replacing one standard with another, or one rule for another. The
move from Humphrey’s Executor to Morrison144 or from Northern Pipeline to
Stern145 arguably falls into this category.
We hasten to add two caveats to our descriptive account. First, not all lines
of separation-of-powers doctrine oscillate between rules and standards. In contrast to the cycling described above, the Court’s pronouncements in Appointments Clause cases have been quite stable.146 As Justice Kennedy suggested in

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

135 S. Ct. 2076, 2089, 2094 (2015).
N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982); see supra notes 100103 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 105-110 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976) (holding that
“[u]nless their selection is elsewhere provided for,” all officers must be appointed in accord-
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his concurrence in Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice,147 this
may be in part because the Constitution’s text on appointments provides more
guidance than its language does on removal authority. In Public Citizen, Justice
Kennedy distinguished cases in which “the power at issue was not explicitly assigned by the text of the Constitution to be within the sole province of the
President” from those “where the Constitution by explicit text commits the
power at issue to the exclusive control of the President . . . .”148 He emphasized
that there was no need to engage in any balancing “[w]here a power has been
[textually] committed to a particular [b]ranch”—that “balance already has
been struck by the Constitution itself.”149 We recognize this is only a partial answer, in part because the interpretive question of textual commitment itself is
also vulnerable to cycling between rules and standards. Still, we do not think
that textual speciﬁcity is without relevance.
Another domain in which stability prevails without textual speciﬁcity is one
previewed above: Article III’s application to agency adjudication, which again
stands in sharp contrast to the intense cycling found in jurisprudence exploring
the Article III question in bankruptcy cases. We suspect that this phenomenon
is best explained not by textual speciﬁcity but rather by judicial aversion to certain kinds of litigation. Since the ﬁrst inklings of the modern administrative
state, the federal judiciary has resisted efforts to assign itself a large ministerial
role over the day-to-day conduct of administrative agency adjudication.150 As
Thomas Merrill has explained, the early twentieth-century judiciary’s “fear of
contamination” by involving itself in agency administration was conducive to a
constrained judicial role in the retail operation of the administrative state.151

147.
148.
149.
150.

151.
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ance with the Appointments Clause); Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 300 (1893)
(“[W]hile Congress may create an office, it cannot appoint the officer.”).
491 U.S. 440, 484 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 484-85.
Id. at 486.
See Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 468-70 (1893) (invalidating jurisdiction that required courts to engage in “administrative” rather than judicial functions).
By contrast, courts have repeatedly intervened to restrict the structure of agencies (via nondelegation and removal jurisprudence), and maintain discretion to intervene on major regulatory efforts on questions of law and policy.
Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate Review
Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 944, 980, 990 (2011) (“During the earlier era, the primary concern was that Article III courts would be drawn into matters of ‘administration’ that were not properly judicial. In other words, the concern was not dilution of
the judicial power but contamination of that power.”); accord JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING
THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 24-25 (2012) (offering a similar reading of the historical record).
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Although Merrill documents hesitation on judges’ part throughout the Progressive Era, his story ends with the judiciary ultimately accepting the validity
of congressional delegations of adjudicatory power to agencies.152 By 1932, the
year of the landmark Crowell v. Benson decision,153 the Court had permitted
agency adjudication with Article III review of fact-ﬁnding based solely upon
the administrative record.154 The Court has not since wavered from this basic
position. Recent constitutional challenges to agency adjudication have been rejected under a loose standard that permits the Court to account for a wide variety of variables related to the operation of different kinds of adjudicative mechanisms within the regulatory state.155 A recent warning shot from Justice
Thomas, calling for a reconsideration of agency adjudication’s status,156 thus
signals a potentially destabilizing willingness, at least on the part of some, to
reconsider an unusually ﬁxed element of our separation-of-powers doctrine.
Our second caveat is that the lines of cases analyzed here even when combined with the few that do not exhibit much cycling do not exhaust the institutional landscape. Notwithstanding reports of its demise,157 the political question doctrine—and the paucity of justiciable controversies—mean that many
constitutional questions about the design and operation of the federal govern-
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156.
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See Merrill, supra note 151, at 987-92.
285 U.S. 22 (1932).
Id. at 63-65. Crowell enunciated an exception for “jurisdictional facts,” id. at 62-63, but with
one exception that language has not proved generative, cf. Agosto v. INS, 436 U.S. 748, 753
(1978) (noting that “the Constitution requires that there be some provision for de novo judicial determination of claims to American citizenship in deportation proceedings”); Ng Fung
Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 283-85 (1922) (acknowledging the same). On the importance of
Crowell, see Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
18 (1983), which stated that “Crowell . . . sanctioned a wide area for the operation of public
administration, removing article III as a meaningful barrier to the use of administrative
agencies to establish and enforce, at least initially, all the rights created by the administrative
state.” Accord Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article
III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 923-24 (1988) (“The fountainhead for the stream of cases legitimating the role of the modern administrative agency is Crowell v. Benson . . . .”).
See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 854-56 (1986);
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 583-93 (1985).
B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1316 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Because federal administrative agencies are part of the Executive Branch, it is not
clear that they have power to adjudicate claims involving core private rights.”).
Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and
the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 240 (2002) (reporting “the demise of
the political question doctrine”).

379

the yale law journal

126:346

2016

ment remain beyond judicial purview.158 Litigation about the separation of
powers thus occurs against a backdrop of institutional change and development that proceeds largely (albeit not entirely) independently of what the
courts do.159 Secular trends such as the twentieth-century rise of bureaucratic
power do not evince the same cycling dynamic as the case law.160 This Part, in
other words, has mapped the law’s trajectory—a path that should not be mistaken for the larger institutional dynamics of the federal government.
Yet the doctrinal cycling between standards and rules—and back again—
still poses a puzzle. Why would rational judges engage in such jurisprudential
oscillation? Our aim in what follows is not to explain it as a historical matter,
but rather to determine whether cycling might be justiﬁed by the foundational
dynamics of the separation of powers.
ii. the separation of powers’ foundations: normative
pluralism in the thick political surround
This Part returns to ﬁrst principles to understand better how normative
values and institutional forces shape interbranch dynamics, and thus create the
background conditions for judicial intervention. The central normative claim
we introduce here and develop further in Part III is that given the two background constraints—normative pluralism and institutional heterogeneity—
rules-standards cycling may serve as a sensible mechanism for judicial vindication of the separation of powers. This Part introduces these two predicate assumptions.
158.

Nonjusticiable separation-of-powers questions include, for example, many war powers
questions, bicameralism and presentment rules, intercameral relations within Congress, and
disputes about the selection and removal of both legislators and Presidents. See Aziz Z. Huq,
Enforcing (but Not Defending) ‘Unconstitutional’ Laws, 98 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1037-41 (2012)
(explaining why “weak departmentalism” is functionally inevitable).
159. See, e.g., Michaels, supra note 16, at 530-67 (understanding the constitutional legitimation of
the administrative state as largely a function of congressional disaggregation of administrative power).
160. See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1878 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(“The administrative state wields vast power and touches almost every aspect of daily life.
The Framers could hardly have envisioned today’s vast and varied federal bureaucracy and
the authority administrative agencies now hold over our economic, social, and political activities . . . . And the federal bureaucracy continues to grow . . . .” (citations omitted)). For a
cautionary note identifying threats to that twentieth-century bureaucratic consensus, see Jon
D. Michaels, Separation of Powers All the Way Forward: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional, Administrative, and Privatized Government 13-16 (Sept. 12, 2016) (unpublished
manuscript) (on ﬁle with authors), which describes contemporary challenges and threats
aimed at limiting or reconﬁguring administrative power.
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The ﬁrst assumption is that the separation of powers promotes a plurality
of values, not just a single one. In recent cases, the Court has rooted the separation of powers in ideals of liberty, efficiency, democratic accountability, and the
often-elusive rule of law. But the Court (and commentators) generally fails to
note that these ideals cannot all be realized simultaneously. They are in irreconcilable tension. Consequently, the separation of powers must enable the dynamic contestation of those values. This basic fact of normative pluralism resonates with the longstanding resistance, starting with Madison, to absolutist
solutions in American constitutional law.161 Power, on this view, is never to be
wholly concentrated in one government institution nor given over to one type
of authority, be it republican, populist, or mandarin. This familiar Madisonian
resistance to tyranny (as reﬂected in the separation of powers) and the corresponding commitment to pluralism (as reﬂected in the diversiﬁcation of powers) should be reconceived to reﬂect not just concern about literal, corporeal
tyranny, but also about the tyranny of a single norm.
Whereas normative pluralism can be traced back to the separation of powers’ intellectual origins, the second predicate assumption of our argument is
less clearly marked or celebrated.162 Yet as a factual and normative matter, it is
of vital importance. We contend that diverse separation-of-powers values are in
practice contested and ultimately realized in a multitude of venues populated
by a broad array of actors acting within and around the three branches identiﬁed in the Constitution. These venues and the actors populating them—
including political parties, activists, congressional committee staffers, state and
local government officials, civil servants, foreign agents, and members of the
general public (including special-interest groups and lobbyists)—constitute the
thick political surround.
Though most of these actors go unmentioned in the Constitution (and
those few who do are acknowledged only peripherally), they play pivotal roles
in advancing or undermining the sundry separation-of-powers values. For this
reason, institutional heterogeneity, reﬂected in the thick political surround,
must therefore be accounted for in any serious analysis of the separation of
powers. In what follows, we take up the normative pluralism and institutional
heterogeneity predicates in turn and then brieﬂy revisit the jurisprudence introduced in Part I to gauge whether and how it reﬂects judicial sensitivity to
these two predicates.

161.
162.

See infra Section II.A.5.
We do, however, ﬁnd evidence in the writing of Madison for our argument. See infra text
accompanying notes 200-204.
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A. Normative Pluralism
The Constitution’s separation of powers is not merely a heuristic for assigning responsibilities and resolving disputes among the competing branches. Nor
is it just a reﬂection of the intrinsic value of the three-branch structure.163 The
Constitution’s chief institutions have instrumental justiﬁcations. The three
branches serve as devices through which a larger, pluralistic normative vision
can be channeled and, ultimately, vindicated. The key term here is pluralistic:
the federal government’s basic design is intended to simultaneously advance
and harmonize diverse and conﬂicting normative ends. As a correlative, American separation-of-powers thinking since Madison has long registered antipathy
to arrangements that concentrate power in one branch or, worse, a single element of a branch.164 It follows a fortiori that the tradition evinces resistance to
prioritizing one separation-of-powers value over all others. Instead, Americans
have been historically committed to maintaining institutional arrangements
that enable normative pluralism to ﬂourish.
This commitment is one that the Court seemingly embraces: the Court’s
separation-of-powers opinions are shot through with normative pluralism.
Here we emphasize four prominent norms—liberty, efficiency, democratic accountability, and the rule of law—and discuss their centrality to modern separation-of-powers jurisprudence.
1. Liberty
In recent cases, the Court has placed perhaps the greatest weight on the
most libertarian of the separation of powers’ aspirations. In 2011, for example, a
unanimous Court stated that the separation of powers “protect[s] each branch
of government from incursion by the others,” but as importantly “protect[s]
the individual as well” from an overreaching, possibly tyrannous State.165 The
liberty principle is hammered home in cases where the threat to individual lib-

163.

See Bruce Ackerman, Good-bye, Montesquieu, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 128, 12833 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter L. Lindseth eds., 2010) (advocating for reconsidering the
three-branch structure and developing a new conceptual separation-of-powers framework
“containing ﬁve or six boxes—or maybe more”).
164. One strand of constitutional theory, however, takes the Vesting Clause of Article II and from
it weaves an elaborate justiﬁcation for the concentration of power in the presidency. See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural
Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1165-68 (1992). Those who subscribe to this account will
ﬁnd our more ﬂuid, multicriterial analysis uncongenial.
165. Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2365 (2011).
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erty is abundantly clear.166 But even where the connection to individual rights
is not immediately obvious, the Justices are quick to remind us they are working to promote our liberty. They do so, for instance, in cases concerning recess
appointments,167 administrative agency design,168 line-item vetoes,169 removal,170 and non-Article III bankruptcy court adjudication.171
2. Effective Administration
Beyond liberty, the separation of powers is thought to promote effective
government by matching tasks to the comparative advantage of speciﬁc government institutions. The Court has credited this goal at some moments, but
elsewhere resisted it. To see efficiency’s persisting allure, consider an unlikely
parallelism between two leading cases, one involving agency adjudication and
the other foreign affairs.172

166.

167.

168.

169.

170.

171.
172.

See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 742 (2008) (“The Framers’ inherent distrust of
governmental power was the driving force behind the constitutional plan that allocated
powers among three independent branches. This design serves not only to make Government accountable but also to secure individual liberty.”). Liberty was particularly salient in
Boumediene, where the Court recognized the broad reach of the “great writ” of habeas corpus, extending to non-U.S. persons detained at Guantanamo. Id. at 732. For a larger exploration of the connection between the separation of powers and libertarian values, see Aziz Z.
Huq, Libertarian Separation of Powers, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1006 (2014).
See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2592-93 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (linking the separation of powers to the vindication of individual liberty); see also
id. at 2559 (majority opinion) (“We recognize, of course, that the separation of powers can
serve to safeguard individual liberty . . . .”).
See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 497-501 (2010)
(remarking that “[t]he Framers recognized that, in the long term, structural protections
against abuse of power were critical to preserving liberty” (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 714, 730 (1986))).
See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Liberty is always at stake when one or more of the branches seek to transgress the separation of
powers.”).
See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 710-11 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing the
liberty-preserving implications of plenary presidential control over the removal of executive
officers).
See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1954-55 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (linking the separation of powers to the vindication of individual liberty).
The concern with comparative institutional advantage can also be discerned across a wide
range of statutory interpretation contexts in which the Court seemingly evaluates decisions
based on whether the relevant government actor possesses the necessary competence and
expertise. See generally Aziz Z. Huq, The Institution Matching Canon, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 417
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First, in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, the Court permitted agency adjudication of federal regulatory violations and state-law counterclaims on the ground that Congress’s “primary focus was on making effective a
speciﬁc and limited federal regulatory scheme, not on allocating jurisdiction
among federal tribunals.”173 The Schor Court rested its ruling centrally on efficiency concerns such as the value of “prompt, continuous, expert and inexpensive” dispute resolution by the specialized Commission.174 Second, efficiency
concerns also emerge in the foreign affairs and national security contexts. Dissenting in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, identiﬁed “structural advantages attendant to the Executive Branch—namely, the
decisiveness, activity, secrecy, and dispatch that ﬂow from the Executive’s unity” as dispositive reasons for assigning power to that branch.175
The majority in Schor and Justice Thomas’s dissent in Hamdan might seem
poles apart in subject matter and ideological orientation. Yet both rest upon the
logic of administrative efficiency. And both prefer the same institutional settlement: reallocation of adjudicative authority traditionally possessed by Article
III courts to bodies lacking federal judges’ accouterments of independence.
It would be misleading, of course, to imply that the Court’s treatment of
comparative efficiencies is uniformly positive. After all, Justices Thomas and
Scalia were dissenting in Hamdan. Another powerful jurisprudential strand is
decidedly wary of efficiency arguments. In Myers v. United States, Justice
Brandeis famously inveighed against efficiency justiﬁcations in the separation
of powers. Although he wrote in dissent, his warning that the purpose of the
separation of powers was “not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power”176 has gained approving citation by majorities in a
range of other contexts.177 For instance in Chadha, Chief Justice Burger channeled Justice Brandeis, insisting that “[c]onvenience and efficiency are not the
primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of democratic government.”178 In Clinton, Justice Stevens assumes the Brandeis-Burger mantle, railing as he does

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

178.
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(2012) (identifying an interpretive canon through which the Court promotes comparative
institutional advantage).
478 U.S. 833, 855 (1986).
Id. at 856 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932)).
548 U.S. 557, 679 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 629 (1952) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (quoting Myers, 272 U.S. at 293 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)); Am. Fed’n of Labor
v. Am. Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 545 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (same).
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983).
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against the line-item veto. Undoubtedly efficient, the line-item veto unacceptably short-circuits the “single, ﬁnely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure” for enacting or revising federal laws.179
This wavering prioritization of efficiency reﬂects a basic fact about the relation between the values of liberty and efficiency in the separation of powers. As
Justice Brandeis’s Myers dissent suggested, those goals need not—and generally
do not—align.180 Whether a decision that permits efficient governmental action
will be conducive to greater individual liberties depends on the uses to which
governmental powers are placed. At times, efficiency and liberty go hand-inhand. But quite often, they are at odds with one another: efficient government
may be less inclusive and deliberative, admitting few opportunities for dissent
and contestation. And liberty-prioritizing government may well be slow and
cumbersome, if for no other reason than the democratic and juridical safeguards of liberty are time intensive and susceptible to manipulation and footdragging.
3. Democratic Accountability
A third normative value routinely ascribed to the separation of powers is
democratic accountability. The relation between voters and elected representatives is a complex and contested one.181 The separation of powers is thought to
promote one quite speciﬁc form of ex post democratic accountability by preserving clear lines of responsibility for distinct policy decisions.182 The clarity
of responsibility enabled by crisp institutional separation facilitates voters’ retrospective assignment of liability at the ballot box.183
The Court’s Free Enterprise Fund decision invalidating so-called dual forcause removal regimes incorporated such ex post democratic accountability di-

179.

Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 439-40 (1998) (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951).
See Barber, supra note 12, at 63 (“Writers on separation of powers have frequently contrasted
the claims of efficiency and liberty.”); see also M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS 63-74 (2d ed. 1998) (discussing this tension in John Locke’s work).
181. The best general account is HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION
(1967).
182. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1740 (1996).
183. This is not the only type of accountability that might be promoted by the separation of powers. For example, the separation of powers was originally conceived as a necessary predicate
to the effective regulation of the state’s coercive powers. See Aziz Z. Huq, How the Fourth
Amendment and Separation of Powers Rise (and Fall) Together, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 139, 144-54
(2016). On this view, the separation of powers enables legal, rather than democratic, accountability.
180.
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rectly into the jurisprudence. Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in that case started from the premise that “[o]ur Constitution was adopted to enable the people
to govern themselves, through their elected leaders.”184 The Chief Justice then
drew upon Madison’s language in Federalist No. 51 to identify “dependence on
the people” as the “primary controul on the government,” and asserted that
such dependence is uniquely enabled (and preserved) by presidential control of
the bureaucracy.185 Even in this case, democratic accountability did not prove
wholly dispositive. The Court recognized the nonabsolutism of the separation
of powers and tacitly let stand one layer of for-cause insulation from the President.186 It also declined to opine on the status of civil servants within independent agencies or on the status of ALJs.187 As a result, these effectively tenured civil servants and politically insulated adjudicators retain their
independence, at considerable cost to democratic accountability as otherwise
preserved through ﬁrm presidential direction and discipline.
Judicial invocations of democratic accountability do not have as long a pedigree as the liberty and efficiency strands of the separation of powers. There is
also considerable empirical dispute over whether the public will in fact treat a
given policy success or failure as a referendum on the policy architect herself.188
And democratic accountability is not costless, so much so that it sometimes
seems to butt up against constitutional liberties and what we may call the rule
of law.189

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
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Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010).
Id. at 501 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961)).
Id. at 495 (noting earlier precedent authorizing one layer of insulation from the President).
Id. at 506-07 & n.10.
For a discussion of this problem in the national security domain, where it is particularly
acute, see Huq, supra note 16, at 930-34.
See, e.g., Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2496 (2011) (limiting constitutional tort remedies on the ground that excessive “judicial superintendence” of government
would raise separation-of-powers concerns and would “consume the time and attention of
public officials, burden the exercise of legitimate authority, and blur the lines of accountability between officials and the public”); see also Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S.
Ct. 1932, 1954-55 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (linking the separation of powers to
democratic accountability). The idea of accountability as a touchstone in the separation of
powers has been championed by scholars such as Rebecca Brown. See Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 564–65 (1998).
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4. The Rule of Law
The rule of law is a complex and contested concept. It has both a “thin”
formal and a “thick” substantive version.190 In its thinner, formal version, the
rule of law requires (among other things) that rules be clear and relatively stable, and particularized determinations should be guided by the general rules.191
Separation-of-powers jurisprudence is alive to this kind of formal rule-of-law
concern to the extent that judges limit the power of elected officials, and empower bureaucratic staff who are more likely to maintain stable and predictable
policies. Similarly, some of the Court’s moves from standards to rules might be
understood as efforts to promote rule-of-law values within a given domain. In
the bankruptcy court context, for example, the Northern Pipeline Court’s attempt to regularize the kinds of issues a bankruptcy judge could decide might
be understood as an effort to promote stability and predictability within a given
doctrinal domain.192
This rule-of-law strand within the separation of powers has recently been
recapitulated by Jeremy Waldron with characteristic eloquence. At the heart of
the separation of powers, as Waldron conceives it, is a commitment to “articulated governance,” in which the process of democratic rule is “divide[d] conceptually into three main functions . . . .”193 By requiring the State to “slow[]
down” its decisional process into “an orderly succession of phases” when making important decisions, Waldron suggests, the separation of powers promotes
regularity and stability and enables broad participation in lawmaking.194 Further, he suggests, the distinct functions parsed out into separate institutions by
the separation of powers correspond to “concerns about liberty, dignity, and respect that the [thick] rule of law represents.”195 When the Court enforces more
rules that seem to turn on functional categories—as when it disallows the legislative veto or line-item veto in favor of “a sort of assembly-line ﬁdelity”196—it
190.

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

See JOSEPH A. RAZ, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON
LAW AND MORALITY 211, 214 (1979) (critiquing the conﬂation of the rule of law with “the
rule of the good law” and instead advancing a formal ideal of the rule of law that has no relation to equality or justice).
Id. at 214-16.
See supra text accompanying notes 100-103.
JEREMY WALDRON, POLITICAL POLITICAL THEORY: ESSAYS ON INSTITUTIONS 62 (2016).
Id. at 63.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 111. The cases concerning the legislative veto and the line item veto are INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919 (1983), and Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1999), respectively. The
concern about articulated governance might have greatest resonance in the administrative
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might be understood as trying to promote the rule of law as deﬁned by Waldron. But when the Court muddies branch boundaries, as in nondelegation
cases or removal cases such as Morrison v. Olson, it undermines the rule of law
as Waldron appears to understand it.
Finally, it is worth noting that there is no intrinsic tension between the rule
of law and the notion of doctrinal cycling. The rule of law prizes stability and
predictability, but it does not require that the law remain static. In Lon Fuller’s
canonical formulation, the rule of law is undermined when actors “cannot orient” their action in reliance upon a rule because of “frequent changes” to the
substance of the law.197 It is certainly true that some of the cases we have identiﬁed mark rather abrupt doctrinal pivots that would have been hard to predict
ex ante.198 But we do not think that most of the observed separation-of-powers
cycling has been so rapid, or so stochastic, as to undermine officials’ or private
actors’ capacity to understand and obey the law. Nor do we believe that most of
the abrupt discontinuities across lines of precedent undermine the rule of law.
Horizontal coherence across the jurisprudence is not generally considered a
prerequisite of the rule of law. As a result, legislatures and judges are free to
carve up the regulatory landscape based on qualitative and quantitative distinctions that might otherwise seem arbitrary.199
5. Normative Pluralism and the Risk of Tyranny
Recognizing the inevitable friction between competing values coheres with
another familiar touchstone of separation-of-powers thinking: the resistance to
“tyranny.” In The Federalist 47, Madison famously glossed tyranny as the “accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same

law context. See Todd D. Rakoff, The Shape of Law in the American Administrative State, 11
TEL AVIV U. STUD. L. 9, 28 (1992) (“[I]n the American context, the . . . rule of law should be
understood to demand that all exercises of official power have a legal structure, which can
exist in any one of several forms.”).
197. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (rev. ed. 1964).
198. In our own experience as observers of the Court, both Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 477 (2010), and Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2010),
were rather surprising decisions.
199. Consider common practices like the use of drug weight to calculate sentences in the narcotics contest, or the use of emissions concentrations to trigger the application of civil and
criminal environmental laws. The numerical thresholds used in such contexts are often arbitrary, in the sense that they do not track points of discontinuous policy effects. Nevertheless,
they are not generally seen as inconsistent with the rule of law.
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hands . . . .”200 He explicitly did not reject all intermingling or interaction between the branches. Rather, he identiﬁed and rejected the corner solution of an
absolutist resolution to the problem of interbranch coordination.201 Against the
risk of a singular, even celebrated tyrant, Madison positioned the Congress and
the courts.202 And against a populist congressional juggernaut, he situated the
President and the courts.203 His larger agenda thus focused on preventing absolute concentrations of State power that would be immune from the backand-forth of politics via interbranch consideration—a concern ultimately about
a static institutional equilibrium no longer responsive to divergent values articulated through the democratic process.204 From Madison’s perspective, at
least, therefore, a central theoretical difficulty of the Constitution’s separation
of powers was the articulation of a static, textual mechanism that would induce
a dynamic, ﬂuid equilibrium in practice.
Consistent with his anti-tyranny orientation, Madison intimated a constitutional theory of capture in the most catholic sense of that term—a concern
that any one branch or faction could or would entrench itself in ways that prioritized one normative value to the exclusion of all others.205 The domination
by any one particular branch or element—by an interest-group lobby, congres200.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis
added).
201. Id. Likewise, in the course of a discussion of the Madisonian model, George Carey describes
Aristotle’s view of tyranny as “capricious and arbitrary government wherein all powers, as
we conceive of them today, were vested in the hands of one.” See George W. Carey, Separation of Powers and the Madisonian Model: A Reply to the Critics, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 151, 154
(1978). Carey’s focus on “capricious and arbitrary” government, though, does not help identify what counts as “arbitrary.”
202. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government . . . .”).
203. For example, in Federalist No. 49, Madison famously warned against too much popular control over the Constitution. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 316-17 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
204. We here agree with Chafetz’s observation that “the Constitution does not dictate a stable
allocation of decision-making authority; rather, it fosters the ability of the branches to engage in continual contestation for that authority.” Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160
U. PA. L. REV. 715, 769 (2012); see also Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 1595 (2014) (developing a bargaining-based model of such contestation).
205. Others have suggested a linkage between the separation of powers and the resistance to capture, but on narrower and more mechanical terms. See, e.g., Jide O. Nzelibe & Matthew C.
Stephenson, Complementary Constraints: Separation of Powers, Rational Voting, and Constitutional Design, 123 HARV. L. REV. 617, 632 (2010) (creating a model that incorporates the separation-of-powers argument that “it is more difficult for a faction to capture two branches of
government than to capture only one”). We seek here to extend this point beyond the bare
unit of the branch.
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sional committee, the civil service, the military, or political parties—equates
roughly with the domination by a particular value, whether it be efficiency,
democratic accountability, or the rule of law.206 Speciﬁcally, domination arises
when a value is locked in through an institutional arrangement that denies or
silences the articulation of other important values. Therefore, a goal of the separation of powers, on Madison’s view, is to preclude this sort of normative monopolization by promoting the ebb and ﬂow of negotiation and compromise.
In this respect, the anti-tyranny value conﬂicts with any and all of the other
values insofar as Madisonian fears of domination lead to a general skepticism
of the forceful expression of any and all of those values.
***
In sum, the separation of powers is a design for governance in which a constellation of competing values is promoted and blended through institutional
arrangements created by the republican process. These values are likely, if not
inescapably, incompatible. As a result, they—like the three branches themselves—stand in a perpetually uneasy relation to one other. This would be of
little signiﬁcance if we could parse out the contested values, assigning speciﬁc
values to speciﬁc doctrinal categories. But value pluralism does not work that
way. Rather, a diversity of normative concerns permeates each of the ﬁve doctrinal categories mapped in Part I. As a result, the Court cannot respond to
normative pluralism by treating each of these ﬁve lines of jurisprudence as a
normatively distinctive “island,” within which the Justices concentrate on promoting a single normative value. Instead, the Court must grapple with normative pluralism within all of the doctrinal categories. It is this imperative for pluralism within and across doctrinal domains that serves as a motor for cycling in
so many of the pockets of separation-of-powers jurisprudence.
Perhaps the coexistence of multiple normative values in each and every doctrinal line is best evidenced in the Court’s treatment of individual challenges to
national security policies. As many commentators have observed, discrete challenges implicate liberty, democratic accountability, rule-of-law, and effective
administration concerns.207 And courts must endeavor to balance, harmonize,
or choose among these oft-competing values. Of course, normative pluralism is
not conﬁned by any measure to the foreign affairs and national security contexts. In matters of domestic governance the Court has likewise evinced greater
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207.

390

See Michaels, supra note 16, at 553-56.
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY 34 (2006) (positing a liberty/security trade-off ).
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or lesser sensitivity to effective administration in the form of bureaucratic expertise; populist administration, as evidenced by special solicitude for public
participation; political accountability, as expressed principally through heightened presidential involvement; and the specialness of public governance when
considering delegations to potentially self-dealing private actors.208
Normative conﬂicts, in short, are endemic within and between doctrinal
categories in the separation-of-powers context. Madison’s ambition for the separation of powers was not a synthesis dissolving those inevitable tensions. It
was rather a device for their mediation via the constant ebb and ﬂow of politics
in which competing normative imperatives meet and blend.209 Many of the jurisprudential threads described in Part I are broadly consistent with this goal.
The Court defends against perceived concentrations of tyranny on some occasions and promotes effective administration of the laws at other moments.
B. The Thick Political Surround
Our second foundational predicate of the separation of powers concerns the
institutional context in which competing and sometimes conﬂicting values are
reconciled. How, that is, are various normative values advanced and tested
against one another? There is, we posit, a complex ecosystem of intrabranch
and entirely external actors not traditionally accounted for in the separation-ofpowers literature that do a lot of the work pushing and pulling, advancing
prized values, and jockeying with one another. Vindication of separation-ofpowers values, therefore, can hardly be accounted for by looking exclusively at
the constitutional branches qua branches. The battleground is much wider and
often subterranean. The combatants are also much more diverse.
This Section catalogs a thick political surround of actors both external and
internal to the three branches. We demonstrate that denizens of this ecosystem
inﬂuence the realization of separation-of-powers values. At times they do so
indirectly and often seamlessly as integral subunits of one of the three branches. Alternatively, they exert their inﬂuence by more direct and sometimes confrontational means, pressing from the outside on one of the branches or those
branches’ subunits.
Accounting for the thick political surround represents a radical departure
from standard treatments of structural constitutionalism. Those standard

208.
209.

See supra text accompanying notes 30-47.
Michaels, supra note 160, at 91 (“The federal tripartite scheme is itself not a blueprint for
value maximization but rather for accommodation and balancing the seemingly conﬂicting
commitments to majoritarianism, federalism, limited government, and the rule of law.”).
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treatments focus, myopically we think, upon the branches as ﬁxed units of analysis to the exclusion of other considerations. And, though most observers are
by now quite sensitive to the diversity within Congress, they all too often continue treating the executive as a monolithic whole.210 Such standard treatments
produce relatively sharp distinctions between constitutionally speciﬁed institutions on the one hand, and partisan dynamics on the other hand, and further
validate those insisting on a crisp divide between law and politics.
We question these treatments. In our view, it is often better to decompose
political life into more granular institutions (not to mention networks and
communities of affinity) acting within, across, and outside the branches. Doing
so provides more analytic purchase, while remaining relatively tractable.211 It
also recognizes that political and institutional dynamics are crosscutting, rather
than acoustically separate. To be sure, this does not mean losing sight of the
“branch” entirely. But it does mean—contra the standard operating practice of
current constitutional law—that strict adherence to the three-branch paradigm
risks obscuring deeper dynamics.
Our recognition of the thick political surround’s relevance to structural constitutionalism redeems important elements of a pluralistic tradition that have
long animated American political thought. Separation’s early American theorists recognized the signiﬁcance of intermediating institutions in the promotion, contestation, and realization of all the normative values at play in our constitutional order. In Federalist No. 44, Madison identiﬁed states as
intermediating institutions capable of frustrating federal tyranny.212 In doing
so, however, he warned that there is “no such intermediate body between the
State legislatures and the people interested in watching the conduct of the former,” and thus worried that “violations of the State constitutions are more likely to remain unnoticed and unredressed.”213 In this passage, Madison recognized the important role that civil society could play in realizing the plural
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See Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J.
1032, 1035 (2011); Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: An Account of the Old and New Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227, 232-42 (2016).
211. It is possible to push toward even more granular levels of analysis, looking at discrete units
or even individuals within or around the branches. But we think the mid-range focus we endorse is sufficiently predictively reliable as well as manageable, in contrast to yet more granular efforts that are likely to be recalcitrant without concomitant analytic payoffs. We also resist the simplifying term “politics”: we think “thick political surround” better captures the
mix of institutions, individuals, and interest groups pursuing concerns that are sometimes,
but not always, aptly described as “political.”
212. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 286 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
213. Id.
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values embedded in the separation of powers and seemingly lamented the absence of such a bulwark.
Madison need not have struck such a wistful note. Early chroniclers of the
American social order recognized what Madison evidently failed to see, namely
that civil society was alive and well, regularly shaping political outcomes. Most
famously and perceptively, Alexis de Tocqueville marveled at a ﬂedgling nation
of joiners, activists, and social and political gadﬂies, convening, petitioning,
and litigating with a frequency and intensity that jolted the young French aristocrat.214 In our view, the thick strata of private actors that made such a strong
impression on de Tocqueville have always shaped constitutional structures and
inﬂuenced the promotion of constitutional values.215
The thick political surround is, to be sure, big and unwieldy. For ease of
presentation, we divide the surround into its internal and external components—and take up each component in turn.
1. The Internal Political Surround
Our account starts with the internal institutional surround—the wide array
of individuals, groups, and organizational actors who form part of one of the
two political branches. These actors are distinguished by their access to speciﬁc
channels through which they can advance, elaborate, realize, or obstruct federal
law and regulation. While such actors can also operate outside of the branch
that formally houses them, they are usefully distinguished from other, truly external actors insofar as their legal standing within a constitutional branch vests
them with distinctive, privileged means of inﬂuencing branch-level affairs.
a. Intra-Executive Actors
The executive branch contains the largest, most diverse, and perhaps most
inﬂuential contingent of internal actors. Long treated by legal scholars as uni-

214.

See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 225-27, 231-35 (Harvey C. Mansﬁeld &
Delba Winthrop, eds. & trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (1835, 1840).
215. More recently, John McGinnis has developed an argument for the importance of non-State
intermediating institutions as alternative mechanisms for generating social norms where
constitutional mechanisms have failed. John O. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville’s America:
The Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 485, 526-43 (2002).
Our argument, by contrast, focuses on the role of the thick political surround as an integral
element of the separation of powers.
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tary,216 the executive branch is in fact highly fragmented.217 Most obviously, it
is divided between White House offices and line agencies. Each line agency
might have an agenda distinct from the President’s and may well seek to evade
presidential control.218 And each agency possesses its own distinct institutional
culture and, at times, distinct approach to legal questions. Most basically, agencies can be arrayed along a spectrum from purely independent to purely executive bodies.219 Though all executive agencies must be at least potentially responsive to the White House,220 there is some divergence with respect to each
of the agencies’ relationship to various congressional oversight committees,
other agencies, and the speciﬁc communities it regulates or serves. This diversity is reﬂected in, among other things, differential treatment of agencies by the
courts.221 More germanely, this diversity is also reﬂected in several lines of cases described in Part I. The current mix of standards and rules in the removal
context, for example, enables a heterogeneous array of vertical control arrangements. The complex deference landscape after Chevron and Mead, moreover, explicitly accommodates diverse combinations of institutions and institutional actors to participate in administrative policymaking, while at the same
time signaling a preference for those combinations that are most inclusive and
procedurally robust.222
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See, e.g., Magill & Vermeule, supra note 210, at 1035 (“[A]gencies are typically treated as unitary entities.”).
See Huq, supra note 16, at 893 (“[A]n executive often labeled ‘unitary’ turns out on closer
inspection to be at war with itself.”).
On agencies’ efforts to insulate themselves from or to altogether evade White House control,
see Elizabeth Magill, Foreword: Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 882-91
(2009); Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1755, 1782-84, 1793-96 (2013); and Note, OIRA Avoidance, 124 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1007-12
(2011).
See Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 835 (2013) (challenging the binary view of agencies as “independent” or “executive” and insisting instead that agencies “fall along a spectrum” between
those poles); see also Stavros Gadinis, From Independence to Politics in Financial Regulation,
101 CALIF. L. REV. 327, 336 (2013) (“[T]he degree of agency independence, and the institutional features that guarantee it, vary across agencies and across jurisdictions.”).
See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2277-79 (2001) (describing the use of mandatory cost-beneﬁt analysis to control agencies during the Reagan
era).
See Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Speciﬁc Precedents, 89 TEX. L. REV. 499
(2011).
See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 236-37 (2001); id. at 246 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the availability of a Chevron “safe harbor” for agency interpretations undertaken in the course of rulemaking and formal adjudication).
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Nested within each of these agencies, in addition, are political appointees
and career civil servants. The latter can be further grouped into lawyers, economists, engineers, and social workers, all serving speciﬁc functions and operating according to distinctive professional norms and commitments.223 The ensuing mélange of intra-executive actors invites the forging of strategic alliances
and the sharpening of rivalries both within and across agencies and also with
actors in other constitutional branches.
It is beyond the scope of our project here to identify and discuss comprehensively each of these intra-executive actors, affinity groups, and institutions
and to explain how their manifold interactions shape branch-level behavior and
ultimately the separation of powers. Instead, we provide a quick sketch of some
key participants, and do so to illuminate our conception of the thick political
surround and to underscore that ecosystem’s pertinence to separation-ofpowers jurisprudence.
First, presidentially appointed leaders of agencies, whether officially independent or technically beholden to the White House, with their politically appointed deputies, counsels, and assistants, play a decisive role in federal administration and thus also in constitutional governance. Congress often gives these
agency leaders the statutory authority to make ﬁnal decisions regarding the
promulgation of legislative-like rules that carry the force of law. Congress also
endows these agency leaders with the discretion to dispose of claims adjudicated within the agencies.224
As a practical matter, agency leaders are well positioned to set agencies’
substantive agendas, to decide how to prioritize competing policies, and to select among targets against which to initiate enforcement proceedings. Though
generally relied on to advance the President’s agenda225 and, in so doing, to reinforce political accountability within the administrative arena, these officials’

223.

See Magill & Vermeule, supra note 210, at 1078, 1082 (discussing the dominant roles played
by lawyers); see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Law and Engineering: In Search of the Law-Science Problem, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 136-37 (2003) (discussing the role of engineers within
federal agencies); Karen M. Tani, Welfare and Rights Before the Movement: Rights as a Language of the State, 122 YALE L.J. 314, 319, 338 (2012) (discussing social workers’ role in the Social Security Bureau).
224. There is longstanding debate as to whether statutory delegations to agency leaders exclude
presidential direction. See, e.g., Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers To Administer
the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 270-74 (2006) (describing the nineteenth-century controversy over statutory delegations).
225. See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson, Mixed Signals: Reconsidering the Political Economy of Judicial Deference to Administrative Agencies, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 657, 667 & n.17 (2004) (citing
numerous sources that provide “strong evidence of presidential inﬂuence over agency policy”).
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positions may and do diverge from the White House’s.226 White House officials
derisively label such divergence “going native.”227 “Going native” implies that
some agency leaders have turned their backs on their appointing President and
chosen instead to identify with the career civil servants or other long-term
stakeholders, such as congressional patrons or the beneﬁciaries of agency programs. Yet White House frustration (and presidential accountability) aside,
agency leadership autonomy often enhances other normatively desirable values
such as effective governance and the rule of law insofar as identiﬁcation with
long-term stakeholders promotes stable and predictable agency policies.228 In
this spirit, leading accounts of bureaucratic autonomy underscore the entrepreneurial role played by agency leadership in depoliticizing agencies, thereby enabling dispassionate expert administration to ﬂourish.229
Agency leaders also act outside the branch they inhabit, in effect operating
like the external actors that are addressed below. They can do so by allying
themselves with members of the media, special interests, and members of
Congress.230 Agency leaders have shown great dexterity in the legislative arena,
inﬂuencing controversial and consequential legislation. For example, the commissioner of the mid-century federal Bureau of Narcotics, Harry Anslinger,
played a pivotal role in framing the use of opiates and marijuana as criminal law
problems, and then arguing to the public for punitive legislation such as mandatory minimum sentences.231 Anslinger’s example shows how officials can
foster a sufficiently broad and engaged political base of their own, allowing
them to make direct appeals to the electorate and Congress. They can also collaborate with similarly positioned officials at the state or municipal level to se-
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For a fuller discussion of the discrete role played by agency leaders, see Michaels, supra note
16, at 538-40; and Michaels, supra note 210, at 236.
See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1300-04 (2006).
Stability and predictability are typically seen as prototypical elements of the rule of law. See
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1997); see also FULLER, supra note 197, at 39 (arguing that the rule of law is
violated when there are “such frequent changes in the rules that the subject cannot orient his
action”).
See, e.g., DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS,
NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATIONS IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862-1928, at 353-62 (2004).
For a discussion of the forging of alliances within and outside the scope of the administrative arena, see Michaels, supra note 210, at 243-48, 252-54.
See DORIS MARIE PROVINE, UNEQUAL UNDER LAW: RACE IN THE WAR ON DRUGS 83-86
(2007); see also MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS
INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 65 (2006) (“For more than three decades, Anslinger used the
bureau as a perch to incite national hysteria about drugs.”).
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cure policy goals232 or even collaborate with their counterparts in other nations.233 These internal actors’ successes on external stages is aided in no small
part by their status as executive officials, which bespeaks authority, competence, and deep (budgetary) pockets.
Second, with or without agency-leadership support, career civil servants
play a central role in shaping branch-level action. They have considerable inﬂuence over the design, drafting, and administration of agency rules as well as decisions about how to enforce those rules in favor of would-be beneﬁciaries and
against perceived transgressors.234 Civil servants are numerous, heavily relied
upon by agency leaders (whose average tenure is approximately two years235),
and—most importantly—insulated from politically motivated personnel actions.236 Their independence helps further, enrich, or obstruct the President’s
administrative interests.237 Among other things, civil servants can prioritize legalistic values and professional norms—and discount arguments that sound in
political expedience and public opinion polls. On this optimistic account, the
constructive yet combative inﬂuence of civil servants may moderate the partisan political nature of the executive branch, changing the mix of values championed by that branch in the separation-of-powers arena. Bureaucratic insulation creates opportunity for mandarin expertise to infuse American public
policy, seemingly in ways that conﬂict with assurances of democratic accountability, but also in ways that may promote effective administration and the rule
of law.238 Indeed, in Harold Bruff ’s telling, it is the civil servants who counter-
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Crime control again provides a useful example. Lisa Miller has documented the growing
role in congressional hearings played by law-enforcement agencies from all levels of government. See LISA L. MILLER, THE PERILS OF FEDERALISM: RACE, POVERTY, AND THE POLITICS
OF CRIME CONTROL 73-84 (2008).
See Ashley Deeks, Checks and Balances from Abroad, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 65, 85-86 (2016) (documenting interactions between national security and intelligence agencies and foreign governments, and arguing that these interactions have constraining effects).
We include ALJs within the broader rubric of civil servants.
See David Fontana, Government in Opposition, 119 YALE L.J. 548, 610 (2009).
See Michaels, supra note 16, at 540-47.
See DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS: POLITICAL CONTROL
AND BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE 30 (2008) (ﬁnding that federal civil servants “often feel
bound by legal, moral, or professional norms to certain courses of action and these courses
of action may be at variance with the [P]resident’s agenda”); Strauss, supra note 27, at 586
(remarking on the civil servant’s distinctive values and commitments).
See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 53, 94 (2008) (“The majoritarian interest in strong presidential control is stronger
when expected presidential responsiveness to majoritiarian [sic] preferences is stronger,
when political parties are less polarized, when bureaucratic preferences are more distant
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balance the agency leaders and thus function as a “bulwark to the rule of
law.”239
This understanding of the potentially rivalrous nature of the civil serviceagency leadership relationship seems to be one that the courts appreciate and
implicitly endorse. In cases such as Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.240 and Massachusetts v. EPA,241 the Supreme Court has worried about politicized agency decision making and thus
elicited supplemental input from career administrative experts. As Jody Freeman and Adrian Vermeule write, the Court in these cases “overr[o]de executive
positions that they found untrustworthy, in the sense that executive expertise
ha[d] been subordinated to politics.”242 Finally, like agency heads, civil servants
also can act externally by forging relationships with members of the media,
members of Congress, beneﬁciary communities, regulated industries, or their
counterparts overseas or at the state or local levels.243
The net effect of these intrabranch and cross-branch entanglements can,
however, be ambiguous. Sometimes, industrious civil servants save the day; on
other occasions they use their legal insulation and mandarin reputations to
slack or advance their own parochial agendas. Consider, for example, the pivotal role that elements of the national security bureaucracy have played in impeding releases from the detention facility at Guantánamo Naval Base, effectively
derailing President Obama’s plan to close the facility by the end of his tenure in
office.244 As one of us has demonstrated empirically, bureaucratic entrepreneurship (via backchanneling, lobbying, and leaking) has fueled congressional op-

from majoritarian preferences, and when the majority’s political interests change relatively
rapidly.”).
239. See HAROLD H. BRUFF, BALANCE OF FORCES: SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 408 (2006).
240. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
241. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
242. Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007
SUP. CT. REV. 51, 52.
243. See, e.g., Michaels, supra note 210, at 252-55, 259-60 (describing various strategic alliances
civil servants may enter into with, among others, members of Congress and members of civil society); John Hudson & Dan De Luce, Diplomats’ Dissent Bolsters Calls for U.S. Assault
on Assad, FOREIGN POL’Y (June 17, 2016), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/17/diplomats
-dissent-bolsters-calls-for-u-s-assault-on-assad [http://perma.cc/DN9J-NVJD] (describing
a leaked “memo drafted by bureaucrats deep within the bowls of the State Department” objecting to the Obama Administration’s policy on Syria).
244. See Aziz Z. Huq, The President and the Detainees, 165 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017)
(manuscript at 3-7) (on ﬁle with authors).
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position to Guantánamo’s closure.245 Although disagreement still abounds
about how best to address the Guantánamo facility’s future, cross-branch entrepreneurship by the national security bureaucracy has, at least in this one
case, resulted in a poisoned and distorted political atmosphere and perpetuated
detentions that civilian and military officials can no longer justify on policy
grounds alone.246
Additional actors with more discrete or domain-speciﬁc tasks also abound.
In addition to military officials,247 there are inspectors general (IGs),248 participants in congressionally commissioned or agency-commissioned advisory
groups,249 and a ﬂeet of service contractors and other private actors deputized
to advance the State’s aims.250 Each of these actors also inﬂuences how the executive branch presents itself to other branches and the public, and thus further
complicates how separation-of-powers values are realized. For example, although organizationally subordinate to the civilian leadership in the Pentagon,
the military has expertise, its own extensive legal codes, cultural practices, and
operational authorities, and no shortage of political soapboxes.251 This de facto
independence from presidential control252 betrays any conception of the executive branch as monolithic, or even exclusively under civilian control, and courts
extending particular deference on military matters seem to signal a judicial appreciation of a somewhat autonomous (and intrinsically valuable) military infrastructure.253 Inspectors general are principally internal auditors of agencies,
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

250.

251.

252.
253.

See id. (manuscript at 29-35).
See id. (manuscript at 25-29).
See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 43-64 (2010).
See PAUL C. LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT: INSPECTORS GENERAL AND THE SEARCH FOR
ACCOUNTABILITY 2-4 (1993).
One such notable body is the Independent Payment Advisory Board, which was created to
help the Department of Health and Human Services improve the quality and lower the costs
of Medicare. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk (2012).
For wide-ranging studies of government contractors and other private deputies helping design and carry out domestic regulatory, domestic counterterrorism, and overseas security initiatives, see generally GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 23 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009); PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING
SOVEREIGNTY 1 (2007); and Jon D. Michaels, Deputizing Homeland Security, 88 TEX. L. REV.
1415 (2010).
See, e.g., Deborah N. Pearlstein, The Soldier, the State, and the Separation of Powers, 90 TEX. L.
REV. 797, 803-04 (2012); see also Michaels, supra note 160, at 174-76 (describing the deference accorded to the uniformed military by other governmental actors and institutions).
See, e.g., Pearlstein, supra note 251, at 803-04.
See, e.g., Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 377 (2008) (reaffirming the
granting of “great deference to the professional judgment of military authorities concerning
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identifying and, one hopes, deterring agency wrongdoing particularly with respect to the misuse of funds.254 Both IGs and the military leadership have ready
access to Congress and thus have occasion and, no doubt, reason to operate externally, in addition to their intra-executive efforts.255 The accelerating use of
(and often overwhelming dependence upon) federal contractors is such that
some estimates suggest they are now as numerous as federal civilian workers,
with many tasked with highly sensitive, discretionary responsibilities in the
formulation and implementation of agency policies.
Notwithstanding their overlapping or substitutable responsibilities, contractors and civil servants are very different beasts. Whereas civil servants are
protected by law and custom from adverse employment actions absent cause,
contractors generally depend quite literally on agency leaders to renew their
contracts, thus ensuring the continuation of their work.256 As a result, they are
quite rationally presumed to be much more politically compliant.257 Thus the
choice to deploy contractors instead of civil servants is a consequential one, in
part because contractors are more likely to advance a political, probably presidentialist, unitary administrative agenda (over one that is more rivalrous and
disaggregated, moderated by longer-term, professionalized bureaucratic inter-
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the relative importance of a particular military interest” and citing and relying heavily on
“declarations from some of the Navy’s most senior officers” (quoting Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986))); Goldman, 375 U.S. at 507 (“Our review of military regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more deferential than constitutional review of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian society.”). Such deference extends
even to the military’s assessment of the importance of racial diversity. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) (relying extensively on the amicus brief ﬁled by retired military officers and civilian defense leaders and giving particular weight to military officials’
representations of the importance of a diversity among the officer corps). There is, of
course, a dark side to such deference. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 21823 (1944) (deferring to the military on matters deemed to be within the purview of military
judgment).
LIGHT, supra note 248, at 23-25, 43. But recent events suggest a White House effort to limit
their efficacy. See Eric Lichtblau, Tighter Lid on Records Threatens To Weaken Government
Watchdogs, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/28/us/politics
/tighter-lid-on-records-threatens-to-defang-government-watchdogs.html [http://perma.cc
/ML5E-3EHC].
For an example of congressional lobbying by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a controversial
public policy matter, see GARY L. LEHRING, OFFICIALLY GAY: THE POLITICAL CONSTRUCTION
OF SEXUALITY BY THE U.S. MILITARY 137 (2003).
See Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717, 748-49 (2010) (characterizing contractors as having ﬁnancial incentives to support agency leaders’ agendas).
See id.
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ests regularly at odds with the interests and commitments of the incumbent
administration).258
b. Intra-Congressional Actors
The bicameral Congress also has a roster of internal players subsumed
within and across the two chambers. These players warrant consideration in
any analysis of the separation of powers because they not only shape important
policy outcomes, but also shape those outcomes differently than might be predicted from an analysis of Congress proper. There are, to begin, party-selected
House and Senate leaders, who wield considerable power over their institutions and over coalitions that caucus together. Congressional leaders—often
serving relatively provincial constituencies, as evidenced by recent Senate
Democratic leaders from Nevada and South Dakota—have speciﬁc formal powers such as intra-house appointments and access to special brieﬁngs and disclosures by the executive branch.259 The congressional leaders also possess informal agenda-setting powers and make committee assignments. They often act
as agents of the “party-in-the-government,”260 rather than as agents of the institution they serve. Principally because of their assignment and agenda-setting
powers, congressional leaders’ work overlaps with that of congressional committees.261 Ranging from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to the
House Ways and Means Committee, these relatively stable subgroups of senators and House members take the lead in framing and conducting debate—
sometimes, as in Chadha,262 in ways the Court ﬁnds problematic—directing,

258.

See id.
See Rafael Gely & Asghar Zardkoohi, Understanding Congressional Reform: Lessons from the
Seventies, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 509, 515 (1998) (noting that “party leaders can sanction dissident members, by inﬂuencing the committee assignment process”); Heidi Kitrosser, Congressional Oversight of National Security Activities: Improving Information Funnels, 29 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1049, 1053-58 (2008) (discussing brieﬁng of congressional leadership, but not members, in the national security context); see also Chafetz, supra note 204, at 736-37 (describing
tools Congress can use in such investigations, such as the contempt power).
260. See V.O. KEY, JR., POLITICS, PARTIES, & PRESSURE GROUPS 163-65 (5th ed. 1964). In the federal budgeting process, moreover, “dutiful committee members [simply] ratify the policies
set by party leaders.” Elizabeth Garrett, The Congressional Budget Process: Strengthening the
Party-in-Government, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 702, 717 (2000).
261. Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why
Legislators, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132, 143-55 (1988).
262. The Chadha Court noted that the one-house veto “resolution had not been printed and was
not made available to other Members of the House prior to or at the time it was voted on. So
far as the record before us shows, the House consideration of the resolution was based on
259.

401

the yale law journal

126:346

2016

monitoring, and funding federal initiatives, investigating wrongdoing,263 and
advancing or quashing proposed bills. They also provide inﬂuential glosses on
enacted legislation via committee reports that some judges use to guide their
statutory interpretations.264 Bridging the two chambers, a range of “unorthodox” institutional arrangements such as budget resolutions and the nowinfamous reconciliation process have developed in response to the breakdown
of the traditional bicameral process.265
Within Congress, a further array of important positions and offices are
populated by appointed technocrats rather than the members themselves. The
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Government Accountability Office
(GAO), for example, are particularly inﬂuential congressional entities. Both
help deﬁne and interpret the annual budget.266 And both sharpen, clarify, and
challenge the positions of members of Congress on controversial legislation,
such as the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.267 Lastly, both directly
inﬂuence wider political and legal debates. Members of Congress, not to mention executive branch officials (and governors, special-interest groups, and the
like), are constrained from making unsubstantiated economic or ﬁscal claims
that the CBO could easily rebut or from taking actions that would invite a stern
rebuke from the GAO.268

Representative and [Subcommittee Chair Joshua] Eilberg’s statement from the ﬂoor . . . .”
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 926 (1983). That single statement was moreover of questionable clarity and, perhaps, veracity. As the Court further noted, “It is not at all clear whether
the House generally, or Subcommittee Chairman Eilberg in particular, correctly understood
the relationship between the” Attorney General’s decision to suspend deportation and the
instant proposal to veto that decision through a one-house vote. Id. at 927 n.3. And later, the
Court thought Eilberg engaged in “obfuscation.” Id. at 928 n.3.
263. James Hamilton et al., Congressional Investigations: Politics and Process, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1115, 1118 (2007) (documenting the history of congressional investigations over time).
264. For a powerful case in favor of legislative history’s use by a sitting judge, see ROBERT A.
KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 35-39 (2014).
265. See generally BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN
THE U.S. CONGRESS (4th ed. 2012) (documenting the emergence of such processes).
266. For example, the GAO is statutorily required to examine government accounting practices
and highlight reporting concerns about particular programs to Congress. 2 U.S.C. §§ 683-85
(2012).
267. See Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’s Plan in the
Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 102 (2015) (discussing lower courts’ use
of the CBO’s Congressional Budgeting Score in statutory interpretation).
268. For the inﬂuence of the CBO on Congress, see, for example, Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe
R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725, 764 (2014). The CBO, for example, makes inﬂuential deﬁcit forecasts that may have an impact on executive choices. See,
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c. Judicial Actors
Our central focus in this Article is the play of forces within and between the
political branches. Yet two of the ﬁve lines of cases charted in Part I—namely,
those concerning judicial deference to agencies and the constitutionality of
non-Article III adjudication—directly involve the federal judiciary. The judicial
branch surely experiences internal conﬂict, due to geographical dispersal, life
tenure, and political currents from which judges enjoy no shelter. Nevertheless,
the federal judiciary is likely more cloistered from external forces—via rules
against ex parte proceedings and professional norms against political engagement. The judiciary is also less subject to internal disruptions, if only because
of the clear hierarchy of the federal court system, the general commitment to
principles of precedent, and the division between judges and their support
staff. (Whereas agency leaders and members of Congress are often outclassed
by their seasoned, expert staffs, rarely would we ﬁnd a similarly inverted dynamic, or even parity, when it comes to federal judges and their still wetbehind-the-ears term clerks.) More generally, the judiciary has a more coherent
and stable set of institutional interests that suppress internal, ideological conﬂict, that prove unwelcoming to the denizens of the political branches, and that
thus result in a uniﬁed approach more in keeping with the standard treatments
of branches as monoliths.269
2. The External Political Surround
The internal ecology of important players within the executive and legislative branches is complemented by a diverse external ecosystem of actors who
inﬂuence how the separation of powers plays out. These actors are the lineal
e.g., Jackie Calmes, Budget Office Warns That Deﬁcits Will Rise Again Because Cuts Are Misdirected, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/18/us/congressional
-budget-office-predicts-unsustainable-debt.html [http://perma.cc/8AY5-3NZP] (discussing
CBO warnings). The GAO also adjudicates bid protests, that is, challenges to the awarding
of particular contracts to particular vendors. For discussions and critiques of the GAO’s authority, see Robert S. Metzger & Daniel A. Lyons, A Critical Reassessment of the GAO BidProtest Mechanism, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 1225, 1249-66. To be sure, the epistemic environment
of the separation of powers is also shaped by other such congressional administrative entities. The Library of Congress’s Congressional Research Service, for one, generates useful
documentation on a range of legal, institutional, and policy issues. On the uses of these reports, see Stephanie Strom, Group Seeks Access to Congressional Research, N.Y. TIMES (May
4, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/05/us/05research.html [http://perma.cc/7673
-H2P9].
269. For extended discussion of the judiciary’s institutional incentives, see Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial
Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional Remedies, 65 DUKE L.J. 1, 63-70 (2015).
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descendants of Madison’s intermediating institutions (including the states) and
de Tocqueville’s civil society.
To begin, we have the public itself acting in its diverse democratic capacities. This democratic public votes, assembles, protests, petitions Congress,
speaks, and sues the government. These opportunities for public engagement
empower various factions, marginal and median, across a heterogeneous and
fractious electorate. The public, or at least those individuals and groupings sophisticated enough to employ the available tools, is also legally empowered to
inﬂuence the administrative process through requests for agencies to promulgate rules, through its substantive participation in the rulemaking process,
through its access to information under the Freedom of Information Act,270
and of course through its ability to bring suits challenging the lawfulness or
reasonableness of agency action.271 At times we see the Court seemingly privileging agency actions that have beneﬁtted from public scrutiny and engagement. For example, much to the dismay of unitary executive theorists, Mead
establishes a hard-to-rebut presumption that courts grant the less generous
Skidmore deference to agency interpretations that have bypassed public notice
and comment.272 Mead nudges agency officials to engage in more notice-andcomment rulemaking, since those who do so are far more likely to be rewarded
with the more deferential Chevron review.273 Despite this judicial encouragement and solicitude, structural and asymmetric limitations on participation—
such as economic or educational barriers to entry—matter for any number of
reasons. For our purposes, they matter most insofar as certain voices that we
expect to be heard in the separation-of-powers scrum will be unnaturally ampliﬁed to the exclusion or muffling of others.
Second, and distinct from the public at large, there are the two main political parties, the inﬂuence of which some claim eclipses the formal separation of
powers.274 Parties reﬂect efforts to pool resources and magnify inﬂuence among

270.
271.
272.

273.

274.
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5 U.S.C. § 552a(4)(B) (2012).
Id. § 702.
See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-31 (2001); Michaels, supra note 16, at 56566; see also David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT.
REV. 201-02 (expressing dismay that the greatest degree of deference is not awarded to the
decisions of the highest-ranking agency officials).
Mead, 533 U.S. at 244-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (anticipating and lamenting that agencies
will shift away from informal decision making in the direction of notice-and-comment
rulemaking).
Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV.
2311, 2323 (2006). We assume the two main political parties remain relatively internally co-
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those who hold a common set of views.275 Parties pursue their members’ substantive interests through action in all three branches of government. Partisan
inﬂuences thus mold the agenda and the output of congressional processes.
Partisan incentives shape the jurisdiction and personnel of the federal courts.276
Depending on how representative and inclusive they are, parties can sharpen or
obscure the contestation of values and interests in the separation-of-powers
arena.
Third, local and state governments also inﬂuence how the separation of
powers plays out in practice.277 This is obviously true when federal programs
are administered by the states, as is the case with many health, welfare, education, and housing initiatives. In the context of these programs, states often seek
to intervene not just at the agency level (where they appeal separately to agency
leaders and civil servants), but also with the White House, Congress (where
they once again appeal separately to their states’ contingent of elected legislators as well as to the relevant committee chairs), and the courts.278 Indeed, the
Court has shown itself to be particularly receptive to states’ challenges to federal executive action (or inaction) involving immigration, the environment, and
health care.279 In one environmental case, Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court con-

275.

276.

277.

278.

279.

hesive and effective, but recognize that this assumption may prove false if a partisan realignment or other shock to our party system were to occur.
Matthew E. K. Hall, Rethinking Regime Politics, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 878, 880 (2012)
(noting that “coalitions use organized political parties to take control of government institutions in order to pursue their political, legal, and policy goals”).
Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts To Advance Their Agendas: Federal
Courts in the United States, 1875-1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511, 513 (2002); Hall, supra note
275, at 881; cf. MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS, at viii
(1981) (describing the judicial appeals process as means “by which central political regimes
consolidate their control over the countryside”).
See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 486-498 (2012) (recognizing states as helping to safeguard the separation
of powers in an era of executive dominance); Miriam Seifter, States as Interest Groups in the
Administrative Process, 100 VA. L. REV. 953, 991-1001 (2014) (highlighting the involvement of
state interest groups in the federal administrative process).
See, e.g., MITCHEL N. HERIAN, GOVERNING THE STATES AND THE NATION: THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL POLICY INFLUENCE OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION 32-42, 146-52,
165-67 (2011); Bulman-Pozen, supra note 277, at 488-98. For the Court’s recognition of the
importance of state views before the federal judiciary, see infra note 280 and accompanying
text.
For an example in the health care domain, see NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). For an
example in the immigration space, see Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., 133 S.
Ct. 2247, 2257 (2013). See also Neal Devins & Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Fifty States, Fifty
Attorneys General, and Fifty Approaches to the Duty To Defend, 124 YALE L.J. 2100, 2140 (2015)
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ferred what it called “special solicitude” on states, ﬁnding states to have Article
III standing even when similarly situated private parties may not.280 Local inﬂuence is further registered when local and state officials, such as big-city
mayors, state governors, or attorneys general, ascend the national stage and inﬂuence policy by leveraging their standing with the public and their political
parties.281
Fourth, recent work by Daniel Abebe and Ashley Deeks, among others, has
brought into focus the diverse ways in which a range of friendly and antagonistic foreign actors, including governments and their equivalents, intervene in
the separation of powers to inﬂuence policy outcomes.282 In the national security context, Deeks has argued that American intelligence agencies choose among
different policy tools in part on the basis of their foreign counterparts’ likely
willingness to cooperate or protest.283 Foreign intelligence agencies therefore
not only create opportunities to circumvent domestic-law constraints—as occurs when allies agree to spy on each other’s domestic populations—but also
supply constraints of their own on policies, such as surveillance and detention,
with important separation-of-powers ramiﬁcations. Abebe, by contrast, points
out that high-level American diplomats, when formulating foreign policy, necessarily account for the interests of foreign allies and opponents.284 Diplomatic
interactions between sovereigns inﬂuence domestic policy agendas, sometimes
with constitutional repercussions. Presidential efforts to manage multilateral
relationships, for example, can lead to executive orders that courts later interpret to preempt state laws.285 When diplomatic entreaties to the State Depart-

(discussing the failure of state attorneys general to defend certain state statutes in the immigration domain).
280. 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007).
281. See, e.g., Colin Provost, When Is AG Short for Aspiring Governor? Ambition and Policy Making
Dynamics in the Office of State Attorney General, 40 PUBLIUS 597, 604 (2009) (reporting that
about ﬁfty-four percent of attorneys general who began their service between 1988 and 2003
eventually ran for higher office).
282. See Daniel Abebe, The Global Determinants of U.S. Foreign Affairs Law, 49 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1
(2013) [hereinafter Abebe, Global Determinants]; Daniel Abebe, Rethinking the Costs of International Delegations, 34 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 491, 492 (2013); Abebe & Huq, supra note 136, at
793-94; Deeks, supra note 233, at 86-88.
283. See Deeks, supra note 233, at 76-86.
284. See Abebe, Global Determinants, supra note 282, at 19.
285. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 421-25 (2003) (discussing the preemptive effects of the Agreement Concerning the Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility
and the Future,” Ger.-U.S., July 17, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1298); see also Abebe & Huq, supra note
136, at 736-39 (situating Garamendi in a longer line of cases of presidential preemption motivated by foreign affairs concerns).
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ment fail, foreign sovereigns can appeal directly to American courts in the form
of amicus briefs (which judges seem to cite at a disproportionately high rate)286
or to Congress and, derivatively, the American people.287 As Abebe shows, it is
often infeasible to gauge the actual balance of federal, interbranch power without accounting for foreign and trans-national actors.288
C. Normative Pluralism and the Thick Political Surround in Separation-ofPowers Case Law
For the reasons just discussed, normative pluralism and the thick political
surround are indeed key background predicates for understanding the separation of powers in practice. But are those predicates relevant to the work of the
courts? We conclude this Part by showing how the jurisprudential shifts detailed in Part I suggest a judicial sensitivity not just to normative pluralism
(which appears on the surface of opinions and in everyday juridical patter) but
also, more subtly, to the thick political surround. This Section thus presents evidence that in each of the ﬁve lines of precedent mapped in Part I the Court has
grappled—albeit in an inchoate and perhaps unwitting fashion—with the
background theoretical predicates we have identiﬁed here.
To be very clear at the threshold, our argument in this Section is not that
the Court has conceived the two predicates of the separation of powers in the
way we do, or that the Justices, whether as individuals or as a collectivity, have
reﬁned some theoretically sophisticated way of accounting for those predicates
in the form of workable doctrine. Rather, our more modest claim is that some
instances of rules-standards cycling suggest latent awareness of the thick political surround’s potential to generate virtuous or deleterious forms of politics—
to the betterment or subversion of the separation of powers. The analytic and
normative framework we have so far developed and will further develop in Part
III enables us to posit a theory of rules-standards cycling (and a corollary ac-

286.

See Kristin E. Eichensehr, Foreign Sovereigns as Friends of the Court, 102 VA. L. REV. 289, 31924 (2016).
287. See Julie Hirshfeld Davis & Michael D. Shear, Netanyahu Speech Raises Burden for Obama
on Iran Nuclear Talks, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/04
/us/politics/netanyahu-speech-to-congress-obama-iran-nuclear-talks.html [http://perma.cc
/57CH-PVRZ] (describing Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s speech to Congress and the
American people criticizing President Obama’s Iran policy).
288. See Abebe, Global Determinants, supra note 282, at 4 (arguing that “the level of internal constraints on the President should vary with the level of external constraints on the United
States”).
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count for assessing where and when such cycling may be most proﬁtably employed).
First, recall the trajectory of the nondelegation doctrine.289 The Court started with an “intelligible principle” norm operating initially as a standard; the
doctrine momentarily hardened, pivoting in 1935 in a rule-like direction; then,
just as abruptly, a course correction softened the doctrine once again, leaving us
with a permissive standard. The new standard was, however, subject to several
rule-like carve out exceptions: categorical bans on private delegations, redelegations to legislators (in the form of legislative vetoes), and assignments of
line-item veto powers (over already enacted legislation).
We can understand these oscillations in the following way: The Court initially encouraged widespread institutional experimentation within the burgeoning federal administrative state. The Court hesitated during the “First
New Deal” as Congress transferred massive, largely unconstrained power to
agencies and private actors alike. Once it became apparent that the administrative domain had grown more orderly, inclusive, and democratically and legally
accountable, the Justices felt conﬁdent that they could relax the doctrinal strictures, intervening again only surgically to prune away what they took to be the
more problematic forms of experimentation.
We therefore think that these doctrinal shifts evince an implicit sensitivity
to the thick political surround. When and where the Court balked—again, private delegations, legislative vetoes, and presidential line-item vetoes290—it was
with respect to practices that departed in important ways from the ordinary
forms of delegations, which typically facilitate exercises of federal power reﬂecting widespread participation (and broad buy-in) from an inclusive, heterogeneous set of engaged actors. Notwithstanding the Court’s experience with
these exceptional and ultimately unacceptable delegations, the Court stayed
true to the baseline “intelligible principle” framework, signaling its continued
willingness to encourage and endorse exercises of federal power that are the
product of a thick and healthily competitive ecosystem of internal and external
actors. To be sure, a healthily competitive and inclusive thick political surround
does not guarantee that only desirable outcomes emerge from the administrative process. But, in such a context, it is not clear that more rule-like application
of the nondelegation doctrine will elicit better results, either on the substantive
merits or with respect to the inclusiveness of the administrative process. As a

289.
290.
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See supra Section I.A.
Indeed, the Court’s rule-like approach to the ﬁrst New Deal can usefully be explained by the
absence of a healthy political surround in that regulatory context. See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1257 (1986).

the cycles of separation-of-powers jurisprudence

result, the trajectory of the nondelegation doctrine is at the very least congruent
with judicial sensitivity to the thick political surround.
Second, in the removal context,291 Humphrey’s Executor can be read as recognizing particular sensitivity to the thick political surround.292 Simply stated
and contra Myers, not all top agency officials are in the same position vis-à-vis
the President and Congress.293 Certain officials play roles that are functionally
and normatively inconsistent with close political supervision. (One such role
would be adjudication.) Others occupy positions where such supervision
would yield negligible beneﬁts, given the pressures emanating from internal
professional and civil-service constituencies, or even be counterproductive in
policy terms given the short-term goals of Presidents. (One such realm might
be that of monetary policy.) Were it not for judicial ﬂexibility respecting different mechanisms of control, Congress might not have been as willing to experiment with a broad, variegated administrative state tailored to the needs and
demands of difficult pressing social and economic dislocations.
The ﬁrst judicial gesture toward that dynamic in Humphrey’s Executor was
rather blunt, but the jurisprudence cycled later toward an even more openended standard in Morrison v. Olson.294 Morrison announced a highly textured,
fact-dependent standard that permitted institutional differentiation within the
executive branch in the form of an independent prosecutor. By validating this
element of the internal political surround, the Morrison Court evinced (here
quite explicit) sensitivity to the risk of executive misconduct enabled by a concentration of authority within the presidency.295 The Independent Counsel Act,
which was challenged in Morrison, had been “a direct byproduct” of the Nixon
White House’s thwarting of investigations into the Watergate break-ins.296 An
amicus brief ﬁled by the U.S. Senate in the Supreme Court also highlighted the
connection between the risk of executive-branch misconduct and the need for

291.

See supra Section I.B.
292. 295 U.S. 602, 624-25 (1935).
293. In fairness, dicta from Myers seems to reﬂect the Court’s concession that perhaps its categorical rule would have to give way in adjudicatory contexts. See Myers v. United States, 272
U.S. 52, 135 (1926).
294. 487 U.S. 654, 690-91 (1988).
295. Id. at 677 (“Congress, of course, was concerned when it created the office of independent
counsel with the conﬂicts of interest that could arise in situations when the Executive
Branch is called upon to investigate its own high-ranking officers.”).
296. Ken Gormley, An Original Model of the Independent Counsel Statute, 97 MICH. L. REV. 601, 608
(1998). On the catalytic effect of the Watergate scandal more generally on legislative oversight of the presidency, see FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARTZ, JR. & AZIZ Z. HUQ, UNCHECKED AND
UNBALANCED: PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF TERROR 20 (2007).
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an unorthodox structural arrangement.297 Sensitivity to this historical context
may thus help explain the softening of the Myers rule into the Morrison standard, which was more capable of accommodating a wider variety of policy concerns.
Morrison seems to remain good law on the scope of the removal power in
some contexts, but it has now been circumscribed by the Free Enterprise Fund
carve-out for double for-cause removal procedures.298 Can this partial tacking
back to rules in Free Enterprise be justiﬁed in terms of shifts in the thick political
surround? Perhaps the carve-out is justiﬁed by the fact that the Court envisions
no circumstance under which dual-insulation of agency officials would be warranted. The attenuation of democratic accountability, one of the key normative
values, is—at least by the ﬁve-Justice majority’s lights—simply too great.299
Perhaps more telling for our purposes is the further carve-out within the carveout that Chief Justice Roberts recognizes for politically insulated ALJs working
in independent agencies. The dual-insulation of ALJs does not seem to raise
Article II concerns of the sort that motivated the Free Enterprise Fund Court.
This may be because the Court conceived of ALJs as embedded within a healthier political surround (rightly and properly cut off from presidential politics
given their judicial responsibilities), or, more cynically, it may be because eliminating ALJs would shift a heap of high-volume, mundane, and even ministerial disputes onto the doorstep of the federal judiciary.300
Third, in the domain of agency interpretative authority,301 the best evidence
of judicial sensitivity to normative pluralism in the thick political surround is
Mead, which (through a return to the Skidmore standard) acknowledges the diversity of administrative practices and then assigns different normative weights
to distinct agency procedures and practices. Mead opened up opportunities for
297.

Brief for the U.S. Senate as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 30, Morrison, 487 U.S.
654 (No. 87-1279), 1988 WL 1031591.
298. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010); see also
supra text accompanying notes 68-70 (discussing the Court’s pivot from the open-textured
Morrison standard toward a per se rule against multilevel removal protections).
299. One of us has identiﬁed a slate of empirical and theoretical grounds to doubt the cogency of
this pessimistic diagnosis and its somewhat wooden application in Free Enterprise Fund. See
Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1, 24-52 (2013) (arguing
against the categorical position taken by Free Enterprise Fund).
300. See supra text accompanying notes 150-152. Free Enterprise also does not address the dualinsulation of civil servants within independent agencies. For possible reasons why the insulation of civil servants within independent agencies raises unhealthy political surround concerns (of the sort that the dual insulation of ALJs may not), see Michaels, supra note 210, at
283-86, 288.
301. See supra Section I.C.
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greater federal-court sensitivity to institutional heterogeneity. As a result, it
might be praised as allowing Congress a greater menu of design choices from
which to choose (responsibly). After all, Congress can be comforted by the fact
that courts will more fully supervise the administrative process, encouraging
thick, inclusive administrative participation, while discouraging (or at least
more aggressively scrutinizing) unilateral decision making that reﬂects an unwillingness to engage fully with the broad, diverse public and other interested
stakeholders.
Indeed, we could drill down further. Just as Mead reﬂects a greater judicial
appreciation of the need to accommodate the increasingly diverse forms of administrative action when it comes to reviewing agencies’ statutory interpretations, cases today are signaling a similar need when it comes to reviewing
agencies’ interpretations of their own rules. For decades, courts have reﬂexively
and categorically extended so-called Auer (or Seminole Rock) deference in a rather blunt, one-size-ﬁts-all fashion.302 Calls to abandon Auer deference are today loud and seemingly getting louder.303 Many propose that courts apply
something akin to Skidmore deference.304 Motivating these calls is a concern
over agencies’ concentration of power—speciﬁcally, the power to propose
vague rules and the corresponding power to interpret those rules with considerable ﬂexibility and latitude.305 A Skidmore-like approach would give courts
greater leave to police those subsequent interpretations (as well as more leverage to encourage agency officials to be more inclusive and solicitous of many
opinions when formulating an interpretative decision). Though Auer’s days
302.

See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325
U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
303. See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1211 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring);
id. at 1213 (Thomas, J., concurring); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1338-39
(2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (signaling an openness to reconsidering Auer deference);
id. at 1339-42 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (conveying a readiness to
overturn Auer).
304. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 616, 618 (1996) (“[C]ourts should evaluate agency
interpretations of regulations under the standard of judicial review prescribed by Skidmore v.
Swift & Co.”).
305. Id. at 618, 647-48; see also Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2168
(2012) (contending that Auer deference “creates a risk that agencies will promulgate vague
and open-ended regulations that they can later interpret as they see ﬁt”); Talk Am. Inc. v.
Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2267 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (similar). But see Cass
R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Unbearable Rightness of Auer, 83 U. CHI. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 12-14), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=2716737 [http://perma.cc/ADC2-9DDK] (questioning claims of agency bad
faith).
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may well be numbered, at least some commentators recognize that a sea change
may not be necessary since “Auer’s ‘domain’ is [already] increasingly limited by
a series of important carve-outs—carve-outs that ‘tailor deference to variety,’
just as United States v. Mead limits Chevron.”306 The details of those carve-outs
need not detain us here.307 What suffices is the observation that here is yet another context in which the courts seem open to jurisprudential pruning to encourage and promote healthier forms of administrative engagement.
The fourth and ﬁfth examples of cycling evince the least sensitivity to the
normative concerns we have identiﬁed in this Part.308 In the case of Article III
jurisprudence concerning bankruptcy courts, we have shown that the Court
has moved from a standard in cases such as Katchen309 to a rule in cases such as
Northern Pipeline310 and Stern,311 and then back partway to a standard in Wellness International.312 These ﬂuctuations stand in stark contrast to the relative
stability of the Court’s commodious interpretation of Article III in the agency
adjudication context.313
We see little explanation of or justiﬁcation for this cycling in terms of the
thick political surround and normative pluralism. The Court’s periodic turn to
rules limiting the scope of bankruptcy jurisprudence can be glossed as evidence
of its hostility to bankruptcy judges, perhaps due to a perception that those
officials cannot be trusted with signiﬁcant independent authority.314 It is possible that concerns about the capture of the bankruptcy process by parochially
minded insiders could justify the Court’s occasional doctrinal shifts toward
rules (and indeed, could also reﬂect a judicial effort to preserve the healthy internal ecosystem of the federal courts). But the Court has never even gestured
toward a reason for its suspicion of bankruptcy judges—or why the latter warrant a jaundiced treatment while administrative agencies secure a relatively free
pass to adjudicate a host of claims. One possible reason, we surmise, is that the
Court thinks very differently about the political surround enveloping the ex-

306.

Conor Clarke, The Uneasy Case Against Auer and Seminole Rock, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
175, 178 (2014) (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 236 (2001)).
307. For a discussion of carve-out cases, see id. at 182-91.
308. See supra Sections I.D, I.E.
309. See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 339 (1966).
310. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67-68 (1982) (plurality
opinion).
311. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2626 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
312. See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1942-43 (2015).
313. See supra text accompanying notes 150-155.
314. See Douglas G. Baird & Anthony J. Casey, Bankruptcy Step Zero, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 203, 205.
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ecutive branch than it does about the same such surround enveloping the judiciary. It is nevertheless our sense that, if anything, the ubiquity of political actors lurking around administrative adjudicators—and the relative absence of
those types of actors in the more austere judicial surround—should lead to the
opposite result.
Moreover, bankruptcy law, unlike administrative law, is largely procedural
in character. It does not change the metes and bounds of private rights.315 As
one of us has argued elsewhere, the scope of bankruptcy courts’ domain can be
deﬁned and delimited to the class of cases in which resolution in a federal forum casts no distorting shadow on the private ordering of state-law property
and contract rights.316 Lastly, bankruptcy judges comprise a relatively professional and non-ideological caste.317 District court judges have ample tools, if
not always sufficient inclination, to oversee their work.318 There is little reason
to think that any given aspect of the normative pluralism that the separation of
powers aims to promote is imperiled by the institutional heterogeneity of current bankruptcy practice.
This brief analysis suggests that Article III-related separation-of-powers
doctrine contains room for improvement, compared against a baseline of preserving normative pluralism and institutional heterogeneity. Given the comparative expertise of the bankruptcy bench, the close supervision available from
the federal courts of appeals, and the necessarily sporadic and disjointed attention that the Supreme Court can give to these cases, there is a strong case for
treating non-Article III bankruptcy courts the same way we treat non-Article
III agency adjudicators: as an occasion for announcing an open-textured standard with ample room to accommodate both new policy considerations and the
previously unconsidered policy concerns of different or emerging democratic
actors. If anything, the differences between bankruptcy and agency adjudication would suggest that there should be more cycling in the latter context because of the wider diversity of adjudicative venues, substantive rights and in-
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Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy Procedure and State-Created Rights: The Lessons of Gibbons and
Marathon, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 25, 34-35 (“[F]ederal bankruptcy law is largely procedural, rather than substantive, as far as the creditors are concerned.”).
316. See Casey & Huq, supra note 92, at 1205-17 (demonstrating that most bankruptcy law can be
deﬁned and operationalized with de minimis effect on private orderings of property and
contract law).
317. Troy A. McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy Courts, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 747, 748 (2010) (arguing that the bankruptcy bench “exhibit[s] the ‘Article III values’
[of] professional, creative, and non-ideological resolution of complex disputes”).
318. See id. at 791 (discussing the ability of district judges to refer bankruptcy appeals to magistrate judges).
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terests, and species of legal authority at stake across the panoply of federal
agencies.
Finally, we demonstrated in Section I.E that the Court has tacked between
rules and standards in its treatment of statutory authorizations for presidential
initiatives in the foreign affairs and national security contexts. Whereas the
Court has treated statutory text as a narrow authorizing rule in cases like
Youngstown,319 Hamdan,320 and Medellín,321 it has read statutes as broad standards in other instances, including cases concerning presidential power to settle
claims against foreign nations322 and concerning the executive’s ability to detain
citizens in military custody.323
This doctrinal instability in national security and foreign affairs is likewise
difficult to explain in terms of normative pluralism and the thick political surround. On the one hand, the effects of the thick political surround in national
security and foreign affairs are likely to be especially unstable both temporally
and substantively because of the ﬂuid and unpredictable nature of geopolitical
conditions.324 Consider, by way of illustration, the shifting pressures on immigration policy created by conﬂict in Central America, the evolving demands of
national security policy given the threat from the Islamic State, and the periodic
shocks from global economic changes. Hence, a set of doctrinal responses that
are sensitive to changes in the thick political surround and to the corresponding changes in the proper balance of the system’s plural values is likely to evince
a considerable amount of variability. On the other hand, there is reason to ask
whether judicial pivots in fact correspond in some reasoned fashion to the
changing institutional ecosystem in this particular domain. Even if judges have
all the necessary information, it still may be difficult for them to determine
whether a rule or standard will generate better deliberative processes or substantive outcomes. This question of institutional competence is one to which
we return in the Conclusion.
In summary, the Court’s work product in the separation of powers reﬂects a
measure of sensitivity to both normative pluralism and the thick political sur-

319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
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Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585-86 (1952) (plurality opinion); id.
at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 620-24 (2006).
Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506-14 (2008); see supra text accompanying notes 130-132.
See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 677 (1981); supra text accompanying notes 122125.
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538 (2004) (plurality opinion); supra text accompanying note 126.
Abebe, Global Determinants, supra note 282, at 4-5.
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round, albeit imperfectly and inconstantly. We doubt that the Court theorizes
the separation of powers in the terms we have developed; we doubt too that the
Court has analyzed the occasions for rules-standards cycling with any rigor.
Indeed, our brief review of the jurisprudence suggests only sporadic, seemingly
unwitting, attention to the dynamics our Article highlights. After all, by our
lights, some lines of separation-of-powers cycling can certainly be justiﬁed as
sensible, perhaps intuitive responses to normative pluralism in the context of
the thick political surround; other lines, however, seem unjustiﬁed, perhaps
even a touch lawless.
***
This Part has set forth two basic premises about the separation of powers
and traced their palimpsest across the Court’s jurisprudence. By way of conclusion, we reiterate those two foundational principles. First, the separation of
powers cannot be reduced to a single normative value. Rather, cross-cutting
currents of liberty, administrative efficiency, democratic accountability, and a
commitment to the rule of law inform our governmental structure. Each of
these normative tugs is evident in several lines of separation-of-powers jurisprudence. Second, threads of public participation, identiﬁed by Madison and
de Tocqueville, knit together into a thick political surround of interest groups,
institutional actors, political factions, and diffuse democratic masses that infuse
and surround the branches, and necessarily inform the separation of powers’
practical operation.
Normative pluralism in the thick political surround does not imply that the
separation of powers is a free-for-all. The dynamic character of the separation
of powers need not mean that any and all institutional arrangements are licit: it
is quite clear that some institutional arrangements are out of constitutional
bounds. Accordingly, the challenge is to develop a theory that sorts permissible
from impermissible institutional settlements, while offering a reasonable explanation of how the Court crafts doctrinal instruments to distinguish these
different arrangements in an evolving and complex normative and institutional
environment. This is the challenge we now take up in Part III, where we consider justiﬁcations for particular species of doctrinal cycling and then suggest
possible doctrinal frames for evaluating our institutionally and normatively
complex separation of powers.
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iii. the logic of rules-standards cycling in separation-ofpowers law
This Part demonstrates that, at least as a theoretical matter, rules-standards
cycling can emerge from a judicial effort to honor plural separation-of-powers
values in the context of a thick (and dynamic) political surround. Like many
other regulators, courts may be well advised to employ both rules and standards to elicit a sensible mix of separation-of-powers values within this allimportant but ever-changing thick political surround.
We begin by explaining the virtues of standards in separation-of-powers
jurisprudence as well as their limitations. We thus identify patterns in which
courts start with standards, and then shift to rules (which of course have their
own virtues and shortcomings) before cycling back to standards. (The pattern
can, to be sure, be reversed, starting with rules, softening into standards, and
then hardening once more.) In developing this argument, we draw insights
from illuminating discussions of cycling between rules and standards in other
legal and social contexts, as well as illustrative examples from the case law discussed in the previous two Parts. Speciﬁcally, we identify correspondences and
similarities between other observed instances of rules-standards cycling and
those we discern in the separation-of-powers context. We conclude by offering
some tentative thoughts on how the separation-of-powers doctrine might be
organized to manage rule-standards cycling.
Again our claim is not that the mechanisms we identify here explain most
instances of jurisprudential cycling. Rather, we seek to demonstrate what a coherent separation-of-powers jurisprudence may or could entail as a matter of
ﬁrst-order normative constitutional theory. If such a jurisprudence is desirable—a point we take up in the Conclusion—we think courts should embrace cycling. In short, our accounts of normative pluralism and the thick political surround combine to provide a single framework for analyzing rules-standards
cycling in separation-of-powers jurisprudence. The normative justiﬁcation for
this framework provides a much-needed benchmark against which observed
examples of rules-standards cycling can be evaluated and critiqued. It also gives
us reason to think more critically about judges’ competence in a separation-ofpowers realm complicated and clouded by the hustle and bustle of the thick political surround.
A. The Allure of Standards
Our decision to begin at the standards end of the spectrum is not wholly
arbitrary, although, given the circularity of cycling, we could just as easily have
played out our argument beginning with rules. The Constitution prescribes
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some hard-edged rules in the separation-of-powers domain, but it does not
fully assign or clearly explain the allocation of many of the political branches’
governing responsibilities and prerogatives.325 Unsurprisingly, litigation tends
to arise in the absence of a precise textual settlement.326 Hence, it may be that
Justice Kennedy is correct to say in Public Citizen that it is not at all surprising
that the Appointments Clause has generated far less reticulated case law than
the removal power.327 The resulting tendency of initial litigation, especially at
the Supreme Court level, to present difficult cases where there is no precise textual rule provides a compelling reason to begin with standards rather than
rules.328
In the separation-of-powers context, difficult cases of ﬁrst impression—on
recess appointments, presidential line-item vetoes, and non-Article III adjudications of pendent state-law counterclaims—are surprisingly common.329 Given the likely posture of most novel constitutional challenges, a judicial inclination to begin by announcing a standard is sensible. The promulgation of rules

325.

Manning, supra note 21, at 1978-85.
Regulated entities’ divergent estimates of the law foster a greater likelihood of litigation. See
George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD.
1, 13-17 (1984). Further, the sheer number of entities within the thick political surround raises the likelihood that one or another entity will ﬁle suit.
327. See supra text accompanying note 147. A countervailing argument is that textual clarity is
itself not endogenous to the choice of words in the document. See Curtis A. Bradley & Neil
S. Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional Text, 64 DUKE L.J. 1213, 1238-67 (2015)
(discussing “the construction of textual ambiguity or clarity” and contending that “the perception of clarity or ambiguity is itself often affected by interpretive considerations that are
commonly thought to be extratextual”). As a result, textual clarity may sometimes be sufficient to generate settlement (as, for example, with respect to the threshold ages of the President, senators, and representatives), but a sufficient measure of political controversy may
well be enough to transform a “plain” text into a contested one.
328. We see no error in attending to the general goals reﬂected by the Constitution and do not
think that our organic document is exhausted by casuistic excavations of the text. As David
Strauss has persuasively explained, constitutional law has never exclusively focused on the
text, and in many instances, the text is only one datum (and then not a terribly important
one) in constitutional interpretation. See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional
Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1457 (2001) (noting that despite “all the attention that
constitutional amendments receive . . . our constitutional order would look little different if
a formal amendment process did not exist”); see also David A. Strauss, Constitutional Fundamentalism and the Separation of Powers: The Recess Appointments Case, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 347,
360 (2014) (“The text of the Constitution is not invisible, but the main subject of constitutional law is the decisions. The same is true of constitutional litigation.”).
329. See generally supra Part I (exploring the difficulty and complexity of issues in the separationof-powers context). Our intuition is that separation-of-powers cases present issues of ﬁrst
impression more often than other doctrinal lines, such as federalism or individual rights.
326.
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requires information about what considerations should, and also should not,
count in determining whether the law has been violated. But courts, like other
decision makers, will often lack this information when a constitutional question ﬁrst arises.330 Starting with standards not only gives judges an opportunity
to ﬁnd their footing in unfamiliar institutional terrain, but also enables them to
invite coordinate branches (and actors inhabiting the thick political surround)
to offer responsive clariﬁcations and experimental enhancements before the
next separation-of-powers dispute arises. Instances where the Court has imposed a rule upon its ﬁrst encounter with an institutional practice might well
be criticized on this ground alone.331 Hence, to the extent that ﬁrst-cut judicial
interventions limiting, for example, presidential removal powers or presidential line-item vetoes have generated sharp and categorical rules rather than
standards, we think that the Court can rightly be criticized for acting without a
robust empirical foundation. To be sure, some of those decisions may ultimately be correct, but we think that the Court would have been better served approaching the underlying question more tentatively over time in keeping with a
more cautious, common-law-like methodology.
Starting with standards can be justiﬁed on grounds beyond this threshold
epistemic advantage. To begin with, initially translating the separation of powers into a hard-edged rule rather than a standard might make it difficult to
adapt to new and unexpected social or political pressures.332 Excessive reliance
on rules rather than standards as an initial matter will likely constrain ongoing
democratic governance—prematurely ruling out some potential solutions and
perhaps also disabling some elements of the thick political surround, locking in
winners and losers, and deterring the losers from regrouping and reﬁning their
tactics in ways that could contribute greatly to the separation of powers.
What is more, the American experience with state-building suggests that
judicial reliance on rules may also destabilize the constitutional project as a

330.

See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 992 (1995) (“The ﬁrst
problem with rules is that it can be very hard to design good ones. In many areas, people
lack enough information to produce rules that will yield sufficiently accurate results.”).
331. But see David A. Super, Against Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1375, 1380, 1382-83 (2011)
(critiquing the general presumption in legal thinking that it is best to delay difficult, rulelike decisions with the expectation that better and sharper decisions can be made when more
information becomes available).
332. See Jon Elster, Intertemporal Choice and Political Thought, in CHOICE OVER TIME 35, 43
(George Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992) (identifying the need to ﬁnd “an optimal balance between stability and rigidity” in constitutional design).
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whole.333 Federal responses to the New Deal are a canonical example of virtuous, perhaps even necessary, experimentation in response to dynamic institutional and demographic changes.334 But the New Deal was hardly the ﬁrst time
that such adaptability was called for. In the early nineteenth century, for example, legislators and Presidents struggled to reconcile their constitutional understandings of modest grants of federal power with the practical imperative of
creating an effectual network of roads and canals, forming a national bank, and
acquiring vast tracts of western lands.335 To be sure, it is always possible to appeal to inchoate notions of constitutional necessity in order to vindicate ultra
vires actions.336 But judicial refusal to recognize claims of practical necessity in
cases of ﬁrst impression seems to be a distinct second-best to the ex ante use of
capacious and accommodating standards that can more candidly account for
the diversity of pressures upon the separation of powers’ plural values and the
resulting need for ﬂexibility in governance.337 The case for standards and the
experimentation and innovation they enable is particularly strong where we
encounter no textual prohibition against the democratic polity’s choice of institutional forms.
Relatedly, standards engage democratic virtues even if no change in circumstances occurs. They allow different political coalitions drawn from the
thick political surround, facing diverse social and political dilemmas, to negotiate and jockey among themselves to propose and produce any number of institutional solutions that embody different but quite possibly reasonable permutations of the separation of powers’ normative goals. Standards hence
333.

334.
335.

336.

337.

The rigid amendment rule in Article V of the Constitution may have hindered such useful
experimentation, but might have an independent justiﬁcation: it provided an assurance to
political factions that their early investments in the project of building the new republic
would not be exploited. See Aziz Z. Huq, The Function of Article V, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1165,
1191-1222 (2014) (identifying and analyzing this hold-up problem).
Michaels, supra note 16, at 526-27 (describing how the New Deal state arose from “relentless
pressures of modern times” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).
See Alison L. LaCroix, The Interbellum Constitution: Federalism in the Long Founding Moment,
67 STAN. L. REV. 397, 409-40 (2015) (recounting debates around the limits of the spending
power from this period).
Thomas Jefferson, for example, justiﬁed the 1803 Louisiana Purchase in these terms. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 279, 279 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1892-99) (“[S]trict observance of the
written law is doubtless one of the high duties of a good citizen, but it is not the highest. The
laws of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in danger, are of higher
obligation.”).
In contrast, note that a constitutional rule supported by a single central value would not
suffer from this vulnerability. It is thus precisely the separation of powers’ normative pluralism that makes standards so useful.
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accommodate the normative pluralism represented within democratic contestation better than rigid rules that would lock in certain combatants’ institutional
preferences or altogether preempt engagement between and among those
would-be combatants in the thick political surround.338
The Court’s jurisprudence applying Article III to agency adjudication339
and its Chevron-Mead jurisprudence,340 in particular, evince such openness to
experimentation. In both domains, openness might be analyzed in terms of the
evolving thickening political surround. As the internal political surround of intra-agency lawyers, civil servants, and ALJs has become denser, as civil-service
protections have taken root, and as democratic forces have demanded an even
greater array of interventions from the regulatory state, the case for requiring
strict, uniform, and conforming practices within the executive has become
weaker. Even if the Court is not consciously responding to those shifts, its relaxation of rules into standards can be justiﬁed in those terms.
Finally, standards have a related virtue, which might be termed an antiThayerian effect. Famously, James Thayer worried about the emasculating
effect of judicial review on legislative and executive incentives to deliberate seriously on the Constitution.341 But standards framed in terms of vague, normatively freighted terminology are not self-applying. They instead require regulated entities to engage in normatively oriented deliberation.342 That is, officials
acting in good faith against the backdrop of judge-made standards cannot help
but confront the meaning of fraught, contested terms such as democracy, efficiency, and accountability.343 In so doing, they are more likely to articulate pub-
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A rule can reﬂect a compromise between different normative values. That compromise,
however, is stable over time and therefore insensitive to novel and unforeseen considerations. Hence, it is likely to be inferior to a standard.
See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 587 (1985) (“The enduring
lesson of Crowell is that practical attention to substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on
formal categories should inform application of Article III.”).
See supra text accompanying notes 75-84.
See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
HARV. L. REV. 129, 130-38 (1893) (arguing that where “a power so momentous as this primary authority to interpret is given [to legislatures],” legislative decisions “are entitled to a
corresponding respect”).
See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 17, at 1222 (describing how vague standards can “requir[e] that
the citizen who aims to be compliant, whether from motives of justice or motives of prudence, grapple with the relevant moral concepts directly”). Shiffrin’s argument concerns
moral deliberation, but her argument logically extends to other kinds of deliberation and
engagement.
Congress, to be sure, has been inconstant in the scrupulousness of its attention to constitutional questions. Cf. Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitu-
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licly how they understand those obligations in a fashion that renders government more transparent and its participants more thoughtful and disciplined.344
This forcing of public deliberation may be especially valuable if courts are reluctant to probe legislative and executive intent directly, as has historically been
the case.345 Standards may therefore provide a solution to the arguably pervasive, but difficult to police, problem of “constitutional bad faith.”346
None of this is to say that the Court will inevitably begin with standards rather than rules. As we explore below, cognizance of the thick political surround
might also drive the Court to adopt a rule as a threshold matter, as it did in the
removal cases beginning with the rule set forth in Myers.347 Such an alternative
starting point, however, seems to make sense in only a minority of cases.
B. The Movement from Standards to Rules . . .
Starting with standards does not mean we commit to standards long term.
Over time, standards tend to be reﬁned, hardened, or narrowed, and thus
begin to transform into rules. We envision at least three dynamic forces potentially at work here, with the caveat that one is more of a theoretical possibility
than an observed reality.
First, standards almost invariably harden over time. This is because as both
judges and administrators see similar legal challenges recurring with some frequency, there are strong incentives to recall formal and informal precedents,348
develop guidelines, employ “rules of thumb,”349 and rely on “historical gloss,350

344.

345.

346.

347.
348.
349.
350.

tion?, 61 N.C. L. REV. 587, 588 (1983) (noting that “the legislature has for the most
part . . . left constitutional judgments to the judiciary”).
For a similar point, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term—Foreword: The
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 67 (1992), which argues that “standards
make visible and accountable the inevitable weighing process that rules obscure.”
See generally Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784, 1784
(2008) (tracing the history of judicial review of legislative purpose and noting that “for
most of our history, courts have shied away from [this] inquir[y]”).
On the pervasiveness of the bad-faith concern, see David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith,
129 HARV. L. REV. 885, 918 (2016), which notes that “constitutional law is distinguished not
only by exceptionally low levels of bad faith talk inside the courts but also by exceptionally
high levels of bad faith talk outside the courts.”
See supra text accompanying notes 53-60.
Schauer, supra note 18, at 316-17.
Id. at 316.
Historical gloss comprises evidence of the “traditional ways of conducting government” that
is used to “give meaning” to the Constitution. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 401
(1989) (citation omitted).
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if for no other reason than to lower the transaction costs of mundane or repetitive governance.351 When a once-novel problem begins arising regularly, the
common-law method of adjudication, with its central reliance on precedent
and stare decisis, is likely to nudge in the direction of a rule.352 An example of a
standard calcifying into a rule through common-law adjudication can be found
in the jurisprudence on judicial deference to agency interpretations. As we explained in Section I.C, the shift from Skidmore to Chevron involved a gradual
hardening of an open-textured standard in the course of iterative common-law
litigation.353 Even before Chevron, and within the multifactor Skidmore test, the
Court had started to delineate a class of cases in which agency interpretations
reliably secured a weightier measure of deference.354 As a result, when Chevron
was decided it was seen by some knowledgeable commentators as less of a
revolution than a clarifying restatement of what everyone had already begun to
understand.355 By most accounts Justice Stevens, Chevron’s author, himself
never viewed or intended that decision to effect a dramatic shift in the law of
agency statutory interpretation.356
Even in the absence of common-law adjudicators, officials tasked with interpreting and applying a standard will likely supplement their initially open-
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Cf. Nat’l Petroleum Reﬁners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting that
“the availability of substantive rule-making gives any agency an invaluable resource-saving
ﬂexibility in carrying out its task of regulating parties subject to its statutory mandate”).
Schauer, supra note 18, at 316-17.
See supra text accompanying notes 72-78.
See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295-316 (1979) (explaining that “properly
promulgated, substantive agency regulations have the ‘force and effect of law’” (citing Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977); Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 222 (1963); United
States v. Mersky, 361 U.S. 431, 437-38 (1960); Atchison v. Scarlett, 300 U.S. 471, 474
(1937))); cf. NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291 (1965) (“Reviewing courts are not obliged
to stand aside and rubber-stamp their affirmance of administrative decisions that they deem
inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a
statute.”).
See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE EIGHTIES: 1989 SUPPLEMENT
TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29:16, at 505-07 (2d ed. 1989) (opining that Chevron’s
command of controlling deference to reasonable legislative regulations reﬂected longstanding doctrine); see also Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern
Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1241 (2007) (“In fact, Chevron’s two steps
merely reﬂect pre-Chevron deference principles.”).
See, e.g., Deborah N. Pearlstein, A Measure of Deference: Justice Stevens from Chevron to
Hamdan, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1063, 1068-69 (2010) (“[I]f you talk to the law clerk who
worked on the Chevron opinion, there really does seem to be a sense that the opinion was intended only to describe what the Justice thought the law was at the time—not to change the
face of administrative law for the following thirty years.”).
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ended directives with “more speciﬁc ‘guidelines’ or ‘rules of thumb,’” that reﬂect their growing body of knowledge and experience.357 These guidelines and
“rules of thumb” then ﬁlter into judicial opinions in the form of “historical
gloss.”358 Hence historical gloss, normally considered a neutral judicial tool for
constitutional interpretation, in fact conduces to a drift from separation-ofpowers standards to separation-of-powers rules.
Historical gloss comprises evidence of the “traditional ways of conducting
government” used in order to “give meaning” to the Constitution.359 In many
cases, these “traditional ways” will be the products of actors in the internal
thick political surround. Indeed, it may well be that the prospective reliance on
such “traditional ways” in constitutional interpretation creates a marginal incentive for some within the internal thick political surround to develop and
publicize practices and adhere to set routines. Courts have long looked to such
practice-based evidence in order to give content to vague or ambiguous constitutional norms.360 When courts use such evidence—either to restrict or to allow
a challenged governmental course of action—they express the prevailing legal
norm a bit more precisely. In short, a norm that was previously open-textured
becomes a bit more textured, a bit more nuanced, and a bit more rule-like.
An example of this can be found in the Court’s 2014 decision on recess appointments, NLRB v. Noel Canning, where the majority opinion relied on “historical practice” to permit appointments during intrasession congressional recesses and also to reject a requirement that a vacancy must initially occur
during a given recess.361 The Court further invoked historical practice to cast
doubt on the President’s power to make recess appointments during recesses of
less than ten days’ duration.362 Noel Canning thus simultaneously licensed and
restricted presidential discretion. Both elements of the decision, though, added

357.

Schauer, supra note 18, at 316.
See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 417-24 (2012) (explaining how the “historical gloss” argument has
shaped the scope of the President’s powers).
359. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 401 (1989) (citation omitted).
360. See, e.g., id. (“Our 200-year tradition of extrajudicial service is additional evidence that the
doctrine of separated powers does not prohibit judicial participation in certain extrajudicial
activity.”); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (“Past practice does
not, by itself, create power, but ‘long-continued practice, known to and acquiesced in by
Congress, would raise a presumption that the [action] had been [taken] in pursuance of its
consent . . . .’” (quoting United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915))).
361. 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2600-06, 2610-17 (2014).
362. Id. at 2567 (“There are a few historical examples of recess appointments made during intersession recesses shorter than 10 days.”).
358.
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precision to a previously uncertain constitutional text. In this fashion, the Noel
Canning decision pressed the law on recess appointments toward precision and
away from open-texturedness. Judicial invocation of historical gloss therefore
became a mechanism for the movement from standards to rules.
Second, there is a less organic but no less dynamic way in which standards
evolve into rules. In some cases, the Court may detect some inhabitants of the
thick political surround abusing the Court’s permissive standards in ways that
subvert the normative pluralism of the separation of powers. This may be the
result of opportunism and disregard for underlying constitutional norms or
merely an instance of “self-interest seeking with guile.”363 The Court would
therefore step in to limit or proscribe certain exploitative practices or forms of
participation by imposing hard-edged rules, tightening a standard, or by creating a rule-like carve out from that still-broad standard’s application. That is,
the Court might recognize that its experiment-encouraging standards are subject to abuse in ways that subvert the normative pluralism of the separation of
powers.
As intimated above, there are exceptions to the dynamic practice of allowing experimentation and then pruning the most destructive or exploitative
forms of such experimentation. We are unlikely to encounter such judicially
encouraged experimentation when confronted with a particularly strong ﬁrst
showing of exploitation or abuse (or readily apparent signs of imminent exploitation or abuse). Under such, likely rare, conditions, courts may well begin
with a rule, rather than a standard.364 Yet even in these contexts, courts that
rush to announce a rule run the risk of preemptively proscribing new and entirely salutary forms of democratic or institutional engagement.
There are several instances in the Court’s separation-of-powers jurisprudence that might be glossed in roughly these standards-to-rules terms, although we caution once more that the Court does not frame its analysis in terms
of normative pluralism and the thick political surround. The Court’s resistance
to private delegations springs to mind as an obvious instance where concerns
about interest-group entrenchment and an absence of healthily competitive institutional dynamics might have motivated the shift from a standard to a rule
altogether proscribing that administrative tool.365 The seeming durability of
363.
364.

OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 47 (1985).

See supra text accompanying notes 325-328 (explaining that the presence of clear textual
commands or limitations can justify adopting a bright-line rule even in a case of ﬁrst impression). For the reasons stated in Section III.A, though, we anticipate that the Court will
more commonly begin with a standard.
365. See supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
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the anti-private-delegation rule, moreover, suggests that the Justices remain
categorically skeptical of the potentially corrosive form of politics that private
delegations engender.366
Recall too Chadha’s insistence that only the “single, ﬁnely wrought and exhaustively considered . . . procedure” of bicameralism and presentment can be
used to alter the effect of legal pronouncements.367 Chadha’s expressed logic is
in some tension with other, long-standing elements of the Court’s jurisprudence, which render failures of bicameralism immune from judicial scrutiny as
a result of the “enrolled bill” doctrine.368 One can gloss the difference between
Chadha and the nonjusticiability of bicameralism challenges more generally by
postulating that the Court believed that factions in Congress had misused (or
stood poised to misuse) the legislative veto. The Court’s decision perhaps thus
reﬂected not a formalist ﬁdelity to Article I, Section 7’s text, but rather a more
situated judgment about the operation of Congress’s (dysfunctional) internal
political surround,369 as no doubt evidenced by the Court’s clear frustration
with the procedural shoddiness and substantive duplicity associated with onehouse veto votes.370 Whether the outcome of Chadha should be endorsed or
decried, therefore, should turn at least in part on an assessment of the Court’s
political judgment.
We stress this less organic path of the hardening of standards, which depends on judicial estimates of contingent institutional dynamics, to underscore
that any such abrupt shift to rules comes at the expense of experimentation and
innovation by virtuous or even newly arriving members of the thick political
surround. This is not to say rule-like interventions are inherently problematic.
We readily concede that the thick political surround may need policing. Starting with a standard allows the political dynamics time and space to play out.
Disruptions or subversions may never arise. They may be dealt with internally
or through the legislative process. But if all else fails, the courts may have to intercede, imposing some rules to discipline a potentially problematic surround.
Doing so later in the process allows for the imposition of more surgical rules,
prohibiting some targeted activities while leaving collateral forms of political
366.

367.
368.

369.
370.

See, e.g., Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1237 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring) (“Congress ‘cannot delegate regulatory authority to a private entity.’” (quoting Ass’n of
Am. R.Rs. v. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 670 (D.C. Cir. 2013))).
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672 (1892). For an extended discussion and critique of that
rule, see Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Legislative Supremacy in the United States?: Rethinking the “Enrolled Bill” Doctrine, 97 GEO. L.J. 323, 390 (2009).
For some evidence of that suspicion, see supra note 262 and accompanying text.
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 926-27, 927 n.3.
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engagement unmolested. We hasten to add that sometimes cycling proves unnecessary. The very threat of judges moving toward a rule may be sufficient to
discourage elements of the thick political surround from exploiting a permissive standard that allows considerable pluralistic jockeying. In effect, this supplies a countervailing consideration to the anti-Thayerian argument raised
above: not only can rules be justiﬁed by their direct consequences, but they are
also warranted when deployment of a standard would “fritter[] away resources” in the form of political conﬂict.371
Third, we brieﬂy note an argument that perhaps ought to have more traction than it does in practice. In theory, standards are preferable to rules on efficiency grounds when the regulated conduct is (and remains) infrequent. There
are ex ante savings from using a standard rather than a rule because standards
are less costly to formulate as an initial matter: the relevant norm does not need
to be distilled into a prospective expression. These ex ante savings will likely
outweigh the costs of liquidating the standard seriatim via adjudication, particularly if there are few cases to adjudicate.372 Imagine, for example, if the Constitution insisted only upon “adequate experience” instead of specifying minimum age requirements for those candidates seeking to serve as a member of
the House or Senate, or to occupy the office of the President. It makes sense for
the Constitution’s drafters to expend considerable effort crafting a speciﬁc text
to resolve problems that struck them as recurrent governance difficulties. By
contrast, the Framers were seemingly less likely to expend effort speculating on
hypothetical dilemmas that might arise one far future day. Only once they do
arise does it make sense to eschew the original standard in favor of a more predictable rule that is now less costly to apply. Although new constitutional text
can be supplied, responsive amendments may be difficult to secure in practice

371.

Rose, supra note 18, at 591. Note that the argument here does not depend on the proposition
that political conﬂict is necessarily undesirable. At least in a democracy, some measure of
contestation over norms and policy is not only desirable, but probably necessary. On the
other hand, at some point, such conﬂict becomes paralyzing or outright destructive. Where
that line is crossed is a matter of judgment. What matters to our argument is that such a line
exists.
372. Kaplow, supra note 11, at 621-22 (“If behavior subject to the law is infrequent, however,
standards are likely to be preferable. Of particular relevance are laws for which behavior varies greatly, so that most relevant scenarios are unlikely ever to occur. Determining the appropriate content of the law for all such contingencies would be expensive, and most of the
expense would be wasted. It would be preferable to wait until particular circumstances
arise.”).
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(or imprudent to add).373 Thus, a rule might emerge through judicial innovation.
Very tentatively, we discern some of this kind of adaptive standards-torules drift in the removal context, which might be understood as a response to
the enlarged administrative state and increased litigiousness over the basic
structures and practices of modern administrative governance. The same might
be said of the foreign affairs context, where recent case law has clariﬁed the
President’s powers to act domestically to further diplomatic ends as America’s
hegemonic role on the global stage has developed. Yet, the absence of more examples might also suggest that the Constitution contained an excess of rules,
and that institutional and technological change drives us not from standards to
rules, but in the other direction—a topic to which we now turn more fulsomely.
C. . . . And Back Again
The various pressures on the way norms are articulated in the separationof-powers domain do not ﬂow in only one direction. In addition to the dynamics described above, there are also countervailing forces that can catalyze the
movement from rules back to standards.374 We highlight three such hydraulic
pressures here.
First, a virtue of rules may be that they embody “quite particular compromises,”375 but in the context of normative pluralism, a rule that seemingly locks
in one such compromise is not necessarily a positive result. Unlike standards,
rules are not well suited to accommodating novel considerations, new developments, or unexpected contingencies. What might today register as an unacceptable intervention by a member of the thick political surround might tomorrow be seen as entirely virtuous due to other sets of changed
circumstances.376 As a rule is applied, courts will identify an increasing number

373.

An exception is the rule on presidential succession contained in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV.
374. Why do courts begin with a rule rather than a standard? It may be that judges underestimate the complexity of a given legal issue, and later ﬁnd it prudent to soften their approach.
375. Manning, supra note 21, at 1973.
376. Consider the role that uniformed military lawyers played during the second Bush Administration in pushing back against civilian pressure to abandon rules against torture and cruel
and degrading treatment. See Jane Mayer, The Memo: How an Internal Effort To Ban the Abuse
and Torture of Detainees Was Thwarted, NEW YORKER (Feb. 27, 2006), http://www
.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/02/27/the-memo [http://perma.cc/VU6N-NY9M]. Military efforts to inﬂuence civilian policy, which are usually condemned, were in this instance
celebrated.
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of situations in which those applications do not faithfully honor the initial
compromise, prompting the courts to soften the hard edges, adding exceptions
and permitting new considerations to enter the mix.377 Further, as Carol Rose
has observed, “[o]ur law seems to ﬁnd . . . dramatic losses abhorrent.”378 Such
losses need not arise only from exogenous change. In Rose’s account of rulesstandards cycling in property law, “ninnies, hard-luck cases, and the occasional
scoundrels who take advantage of them” are the culprits who “muck up” rules
by presenting cases whose outcomes under those rules the courts ﬁnd distasteful, or even immoral.379
The thick political surround, we think, is replete with Rose’s characters.
Consider, for example, the litigant who brings a claim in a non-Article III forum, and then, upon losing in that forum, invokes a constitutional objection to
agency adjudication.380 That litigant’s strategic behavior makes it difficult for
the Court to shut the door entirely on non-Article III adjudication of a given
strain (even if it were inclined to do so in the ﬁrst place). But as the memory of
the rule-motivating scoundrel fades, the Justices may throttle back the doctrine
from a rule to a standard. This responsiveness to “occasional scoundrels” can
also be glimpsed in another recent non-Article III adjudication decision, Wellness International.381 Faced with a debtor who repeatedly engaged in “evasive
and dilatory tactics,”382 the Supreme Court declined to apply Stern’s “formalistic and unbending rules,” but instead took account of “practical effect[s]” to allow waiver of an Article III objection.383 It is not hard to read the Wellness International Court’s retreat from the Stern rule’s rigor as informed by distaste
toward the actions of bad-faith litigants.

377.

378.
379.

380.

381.
382.
383.
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Jessica Bulman-Pozen & David E. Pozen, Uncivil Obedience, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 843
(2015) (“The rigidity of rules often means that they can be implemented in ways that are
consistent with their terms—and therefore presumptively lawful—yet insensitive to their
underlying purposes and presuppositions or to the customs of compliance and enforcement
that have developed in a given context.”).
Rose, supra note 18, at 598.
Id. at 587; see also Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1745, 1773-74 (1976) (defending standards on the ground that they allow beneﬁcial redistributive impulses and promote altruism).
For a case in which the Court explicitly acknowledged this problem, see Commodity Futures
Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 837-38 (1986), which documents a respondent’s
volte-face and refuses to allow him to beneﬁt from it.
Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1944-45 (2015).
Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 727 F.3d 751, 754 (7th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 1932
(2015).
Wellness Int’l, 135 S. Ct. at 1944.
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Second, the verbal formulations of rules often contain unintentionally ambiguous or vague terms that lend themselves to standard-like treatment. Limited judicial foresight makes a measure of ineffability inevitable whenever a
constitutional norm is speciﬁed.384 “Even the most speciﬁc of rules may be
avoided” if the rule-interpreter decides “to engraft an exception to the rule at
the moment of its application,”385 especially in a domain characterized by normative pluralism. Even the judges who most embrace the orthodoxies of “formalism” are not immune from this temptation. For example, when the Court
announced a ﬁrm rule against dual for-cause constraints on the President’s removal authority in Free Enterprise Fund, it took pains to stress that its conclusion did not apply to agency adjudicators serving in independent agencies.386
Although the Free Enterprise Fund Court used a rule to limit Congress’s discretion to some extent, at the same time it fashioned this particular edge of the
rule as a standard. Such a partial standard engrafted onto a simultaneously announced rule may imply that the Court is itself hesitant to lock in certain dynamics within the political surround.
Another, slightly different way in which functional instability arises is when
statutory interpretation is necessarily embedded within the operation of a separation-of-powers rule, and judges retain large discretion over how to gloss legislative work product. We have suggested that this characterizes both Youngstown and Chevron—two legal regimes that have proved signiﬁcantly more
unstable than their verbal formulation might lead one to expect.387 The result
of ambiguous rules coupled with embedded statutory interpretation is predictable enough: their presence makes the respective legal regimes more likely to
drift toward standard-like norms.
Third, given the heterogeneity of the thick political surround, it is possible
that some of those ostensibly regulated by the rule, or who are handicapped by
the rule’s application, will seek to take advantage of the hard-edged character of
the rule in order to claim an exemption or otherwise avoid its effects. Efforts to
circumvent hard-edged rules will over time provoke what Brannon Denning
and Michael Kent call “anti-evasion doctrines,” or “doctrines developed by
courts—usually designed as standards, as opposed to rules—that supplement
384.

See Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical Issues, 82 CALIF. L.
REV. 509, 524-25 (1994) (explaining why even “arbitrary stipulation” of meaning will not
eliminate vagueness).
385. Schauer, supra note 18, at 312.
386. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 507 n.10 (2010)
(“[O]ur holding also does not address that subset of independent agency employees who
serve as administrative law judges.”).
387. See supra Sections I.C, I.E.
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other doctrines (designed as rules) to . . . prevent officials from complying with
the form of the previously announced rule, while subverting [its] substance . . . .”388 Although Denning and Kent supply examples from congressional power, federalism, and rights jurisprudences,389 the dynamic they identify can be discerned in the separation-of-powers context too. One famous
(albeit unlitigated) example of evasion in the separation-of-powers context is
the “Saxbe ﬁx,” which allows a sitting legislator to secure a cabinet position
notwithstanding the bright-line rule speciﬁed in the text of the Emoluments
Clause.390 When regulated entities seek routes around a rule, courts may shift
away from hard-edged rules and embrace (or re-embrace) more multifactorial
standards. The mere fact of a rule’s exploitation, however, may not be sufficient
to justify such a drift. It may be that a hard-edged rule, even when subject to
some circumvention, is more manageable and effective in promoting separation-of-powers values than the best available standard. The effect of interestgroup circumvention on rules, as a result, depends not only on the extent of
such bad-faith behavior, but also on the relative attractiveness of an alternative
standard.
This ﬁnal dynamic, we note in closing, has a more salutary, alternative trajectory. For it is also possible that rules will be relaxed into standards because
regulated actors have become sufficiently socialized into a normative disposition that severe and inﬂexible judicial regulation of the thick political surround
is no longer warranted. Whether this more optimistic dynamic is observed, as
opposed to its more pessimistic ﬂip side, is—as with all of these dynamics—
ultimately a question of empirics.
D. The Motors of Doctrinal Cycling
The preceding Sections have explored how various combinations of the
separation of powers’ normative pluralism and its thick political surround can
catalyze judicial cycling between rules and standards. By adumbrating these
forces, we have strived to illustrate—at least as a theoretical matter—how a rational, good-faith judge could end up moving between rules and standards in
388.

Brannon P. Denning & Michael B. Kent, Jr., Anti-Evasion Doctrines in Constitutional Law,
2012 UTAH L. REV. 1773, 1776.
389. Id. at 1780-93.
390. For illuminating discussions, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is Lloyd Bentsen Unconstitutional?,
46 STAN. L. REV. 907, 908-11 (1994); and Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Workarounds, 87
TEX. L. REV. 1499, 1501 (2009), which discuss the Saxbe ﬁx as one example of a constitutional workaround that Congress can employ to escape the restrictions of the Emoluments
Clause.
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ways that seem to transcend ideological or methodological camps. In contrast,
that same rational, good-faith judge could not vindicate the same range of
normative values under evolving institutional conditions if she merely hewed
to a single kind of legal norm, whether rule or standard. Stability in the form of
stare decisis would do little to promote the full spectrum of relevant normative
values given continuing developments, both good and bad, within the thick
political surround. A recurring question surrounding allegations of undue inﬂuence by a particular actor or set of actors within the thick political surround
is not susceptible to static judicial analysis. Circumstances change. Other actors
in the thick political surround become more or less powerful. And other procedures become more or less transparent and inclusive.
Judges looking to what they did in previous cases is the judicial equivalent
to what generals are often chided for: that is, ﬁghting the last war. We were,
perhaps, all too slow to realize that Vietnam was not World War II. Given
growing inequalities in wealth and income, it might behoove judges to treat
civil society today very differently from the civil society they encountered at the
time the Administrative Procedure Act was enacted in 1946.391 Thus, rather
than being an indication of jurisprudential dysfunction, rules-standards cycling
in the separation of powers can be a sensible response to a complex judicial
task. And, again, we emphasize rules versus standards, and not formalism versus functionalism, to make clear that rational judges can coherently alternate
between the two approaches without doing violence to their constitutional theories or normative commitments.
Importantly, the justiﬁcations we have developed for cycling in separationof-powers law do not necessarily or even logically extend to cycling in the statutory interpretation contexts of Chevron392 and Youngstown.393 To the contrary,
such oscillations in statutory interpretation contexts impose greater costs, undermining legislatures’ abilities to predict how their interventions will be interpreted and applied.394 Greater stability in the forms and methods of statutory interpretation thus may be independently desirable as a means of lowering

391.

See Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codiﬁed as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.).
392. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
393. See supra notes 115-118 and accompanying text.
394. See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modiﬁed Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1822-29, 1848, 1851 (2010) (exploring and endorsing the idea of “methodological stare decisis” and arguing in favor of
judges “settling on a consistent approach” to statutory interpretation in order to “increase
predictability and systemic coordination” for the many parties involved in statutory interpretation).
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the cost of congressional action.395 In the foreign affairs context, moreover, it is
our impression that the Court does not stick with a rule or standard for an extended period of time. Rather, it seems to tack rapidly between rules and
standards across different issues (e.g., military detention and the death penalty) and even within given issue domains (e.g., immigration).396 Although rapid
shifts are observed in other parts of the jurisprudence, the phenomenon attracts less notice because shifts in the modality of statutory interpretation do
not have the precedential force, or salience, that changes in ﬁrst-order constitutional rules possess.397 Cycling in statutory interpretation may therefore result
in even greater uncertainty and even higher obstacles to effectual congressional
action.
Finally, we stress that our account is not intended to be comprehensive in
the sense of exhausting all possible engines of cycling. Indeed, we acknowledge
that cycling between rules and standards can emerge for other, less salutary
reasons. For example, any decision-making procedure involving more than two
participants making choices among more than two options can produce instability, with any choice being vulnerable to defeat by another.398 As one of us has
explored elsewhere, the possibility of decisional instability explains many
structural constitutional rules.399 Cycling might also occur if the ideological
composition of the Court shifted over time in ways that led it to seesaw as a result. Although we have explained why ideological shifts in the Court do not
appear to be the root explanation for much of the rules-standards cycling we
identify, we concede that it is possible that some instances of instability in the
separation-of-powers case law, just like some instances of instability in other
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To be sure, it may be that keeping legislative enactment costs high is a normatively desirable
goal. But we are skeptical that stochastic judicial interpretation strategies are a good way to
achieve that end.
See supra Section I.E.
See, e.g., Gluck, supra note 394, at 1754 (“[T]he practice of giving precedential effect to judicial statements about methodology is generally absent from the jurisprudence of mainstream federal statutory interpretation . . . .”). This is certainly true in the Youngstown context, but perhaps not in the Chevron context where a veritable cottage industry has
developed around scrutinizing the Justices’ every utterance, intimation, and offhanded remark and documenting the slightest doctrinal twists and turns.
For a brisk and nontechnical introduction to the technical basis for this claim, see Amartya
Sen, Arrow and the Impossibility Theorem, in ERIC MASKIN & AMARTYA SEN, THE ARROW IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM 29, 33-36, 38 (2014).
See Aziz Z. Huq, The Constitutional Law of Agenda Control, 104 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming
Dec. 2016) (manuscript at 20-38) (on ﬁle with authors) (describing how congressional, executive, and judicial agenda-controlling mechanisms can overcome the instability of democratic choice).
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constitutional and statutory domains, simply reﬂect changes in the Court’s personnel.
E. Organizing Frameworks for Judicial Review
We conclude this Part by sketching, albeit at a relatively high level of abstraction, three possible judicial strategies for enforcing the separation of powers in light of the realities of normative pluralism and institutional heterogeneity. The three alternatives developed below are intended as tentative suggestions
of how courts might bring order—and make plain that they are bringing order—to the normative and empirical complexity immanent in the separation of
powers. Each strategy picks out a different institutional dynamic as a potential
focus of judicial attention. Choosing among these alternative strategies demands yet further normative deliberation. We bracket for now the question
how to make this election (and indeed, whether to make the election at all),
and instead simply illuminate a range of strategic options open to rational,
good-faith judges in the separation-of-powers context.
Our analysis suggests that many internal and external actors inﬂuence the
ebb and ﬂow of interbranch relations, with any number of attendant effects on
the separation of powers’ plural values. Again, the separation of powers includes many diverse practices and patterns of institutional behavior. As a normative matter, however, not all these strains of inﬂuence merit the same measure of respect or approbation. A normative analysis of the separation of
powers—and, more speciﬁcally, a judicial treatment of that structure—must
recognize that some practices, persons, and outcomes emerging from the thick
political surround are more legitimate than others. It must also develop a typology for organizing and analyzing different kinds of inter- and intrabranch
dynamics.
Consider ﬁrst the possibility that such a normative analysis should focus
upon which practices inform the separation of powers. That is, evaluating the
thick political surround would involve homing in on the form or modality of
engagement between one or more of the players we have identiﬁed and the
branch in question. It also requires asking whether this kind of engagement is
legally authorized or otherwise consistent with the norms of democratic intercourse and the plurality of values underlying the separation of powers.
To ﬂesh out what this means in practice, it is useful to consider legality as a
criterion of legitimate institutional engagement. On the one hand, acting pursuant to express constitutional or statutory authorization or pursuant to express rights or prerogatives ought readily to satisfy this requirement. International treaty negotiations or commitments, governors’ speeches criticizing
federal policy, public comments on pending rules, and agency audits spear-
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headed by inspectors general would all rank as acceptable practices. So too
would those practices conventionally understood as within the legal rights of
institutions and individuals, such as foreign governments’ submission of amicus briefs, congressional committees’ guiding of agency spending, and public
lobbying of Congress, agencies, or the White House. Conversely, acting in contravention of constitutional or statutory law, or in some instances acting contrary to longstanding practice, would raise red ﬂags about the separation-ofpowers merits of that practice. Ignoble practices might include, among other
things, lobbying federal judges or agency adjudicators, efforts by mid-level
military officers to circumvent the chain of command, and agency actions taken
unilaterally by either agency leaders or civil servants, excluding the views of the
other (and excluding members of the public who are, of course, legally authorized to ﬁle comments, etc.).
A second potential lens for analysis would focus on whether the actor
properly belongs in the thick political surround in the ﬁrst instance. Do foreign
lobbyists merit consideration? Should the nationality of the relevant actor matter? Perhaps inﬂuence by the Bank of England is appropriate, while entreaties
from Iran’s Guardianship Council are not? Likewise, how should government
contractors be conceptualized: is their inﬂuence tolerable when performing
ministerial or clerical duties but not when carrying out sensitive, discretionladen policymaking responsibilities? We might even be so bold as to quibble
with congressional committees. Are those that are truly representative of the
plenary houses legitimate, meriting due respect within the thick political surround, whereas those committees that are unrepresentative of the bodies as a
whole—such as the agricultural committees stacked with representatives from
the Plains States—somehow suspect? These are of course difficult questions—
empirically, politically, and often diplomatically—but ones we might need to
consider once acknowledging the thick political surround and assessing its
effect on a well-functioning separation of powers.
A ﬁnal approach to assessing the thick political surround would look to outputs, rather than inputs, and would measure these outputs according to some
criterion of desirable results. For example, this strategy would require asking
whether an extra push by Group of 7 central bankers or North Atlantic Treaty
Organization generals properly emboldens the executive branch as it battles
Congress vis-à-vis primacy in matters of American diplomatic, defense, and international economic policy. The approach would also obligate courts to focus
less on inquiring whether the composition of congressional committees is sufficiently diverse and more on whether the funneling of legislative work through
said committees generates a desirable level of congressional constraint on the
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executive.400 And ﬁnally, it would require asking whether politically compliant
contractors, who sideline independent civil servants, should be welcomed as
agents of cost-saving, or condemned for consolidating administrative power in
ways that make the executive branch problematically forceful (and unnaturally
unitary).
conclusion
The central aim of this Article has been to isolate and analyze an element of
separation-of-powers jurisprudence that to date has been ignored or maligned.
Across a wide variety of doctrinal contexts, the Court cycles between rules and
standards, and back again. This cycling cuts across and blends the categories of
formalism and functionalism. As a result, our account suggests that the canonical formalist/functionalist dichotomies generally used to evaluate separationof-powers jurisprudence have been systematically obscuring a more complicated, more dynamic, and more interesting picture.
To better understand the potential justiﬁcations for such doctrinal cycling,
we have returned to the ﬁrst principles of our separation of powers. We have
identiﬁed two predicate facts about the foundation of our constitutional design—normative pluralism and the thick political surround. Together, these
predicates create fruitful conditions for doctrinal cycling between rules and
standards. They do so by encouraging robust, inclusive political engagement
while disciplining practices and persons deemed exploitative or threatening of a
well-functioning separation of powers. We have thus offered here a theoretical
framework for understanding and evaluating the normative and institutional
pressures that shape the separation of powers. We have also provided links between that framework and the particular doctrinal instances of rules-standards
cycling. Our framework not only illuminates the predicate institutional and
normative conditions in which the separation of powers unfolds, but also
charts the speciﬁc mechanisms that might connect normative pluralism and the
thick political surround on the one hand to rules-standards cycling on the other. In concluding, we have offered a rough, tentative sketch of the kinds of doctrinal frames that rational, good-faith judges might adopt in a separation-ofpowers jurisprudence. This sketch provides a sense of how judicial engagement
with normative pluralism in the thick political surround might be conceptualized in a more systematic way.
400. See,

e.g., Joshua D. Clinton et al., Inﬂuencing the Bureaucracy: The Irony of Congressional Oversight, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 387, 399 (2014) (concluding that increasing the number of congressional committees involved in oversight can undercut the ability of Congress to check the
presidency or the bureaucracy).
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Choosing among these judicial strategies—and indeed determining whether any one is attractive—requires a prior judgment about the institutional competence of federal courts to make the kind of evaluations that our framework
suggests. To make those judgments, we believe courts must be sensitive to the
manifold ways in which separation-of-powers goals are implicated in a policy
domain. Judges must be cognizant of both the risks and opportunities presented by the thick political surround, ranging from the prospect of institutional
capture by interest groups to the possibility that pressure from internal bureaucratic actors can generate salutary democratic accountability. Courts must also
remain poised to revise previous judgments, as the elements of the thick political surround respond to prior rules or standards, or as new policy exigencies
impinge upon, or even compromise, existing institutional arrangements.
Additional complications arise because federal courts do not stand, at least
not fully, outside the thick political surround.401 As Eric Posner and Adrian
Vermeule have observed, it is a mistake to diagnose a public-law problem by
drawing “upon the political science literature to offer deeply pessimistic accounts of the ambitious, partisan, or self-interested motives of relevant actors,”
but then to proceed by assuming that judges can somehow reach “publicspirited solutions” free of the pernicious forces that otherwise shape institutional behavior.402 Staking out a robust role for the judiciary in separation-ofpowers debates hence demands an extended defense of the courts’ ability to
play the role of a neutral arbiter403 by successfully navigating ideological and
institutional pressures of their own. That position also requires a comparative
judgment about when judicial supervision will be superior to the arrangements
negotiated by the political branches themselves.404
Whether the Court is capable of reaching informed judgments about these
institutional dynamics, whether its deﬁciencies as a group of law office historians, economists, political scientists, and sociologists can be remedied by amicus
brieﬁng, and whether ideological preferences will swamp rigorous, principled
evaluation are all difficult questions. Even more challenging are questions
about the dynamic effect of judicial intervention on the separation of powers:
Will such intervention elicit more desirable forms of behavior from the thick
401.

See Huq, supra note 269, at 53-58 (analyzing institutional determinants of Article III judges’
preferences).
402. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1743, 1745
(2013).
403. For contrasting assessments, compare Michaels, supra note 160, which offers an optimistic
perspective, with Huq, supra note 269, at 75-80, which takes a more skeptical position.
404. See, e.g., Huq, supra note 204, at 1674-86 (theorizing conditions under which judicial deference to politically negotiated outcomes will be superior to active judicial supervision).
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political surround, and the branches they act upon, as various actors compete
to elicit judicial endorsement by careful, deliberative, and open behavior? Or
alternatively, will judicial enforcement of the separation of powers encourage
narrowly focused interest groups to invoke that concept in judicial fora for parochial or partisan gain?405 If courts are not able to disentangle sincere from
self-interested invocations of the Constitution (or if that distinction is in practice muddled and hard to draw because of pervasive mixed motivations), then
judges’ interventions might have undesirable effects.
Reasonable people, we think, can disagree about the answers to these questions. This Article has not aimed to resolve ﬁnally those enduring puzzles, but
is instead designed to show that previous scholarship has not gone far in identifying the terms on which debate about the judicial role enforcing the separation of powers must proceed. Indeed, having identiﬁed the salience of the thick
political surround and normative pluralism, we see no turning back to the stale,
over-determined formalism/functionalism binary. More importantly, we discern no basis for ﬁxating on the three constitutional branches simply because it
is too difficult to navigate the thick political surround.
With those cautionary disclaimers in mind, we hope that this Article
broadens our understanding of a much-maligned domain of constitutional jurisprudence. We furthermore hope it has clariﬁed what considerations are
needed for the Court to advance successfully the competing and conﬂicting
separation-of-powers values in the ﬂuid, dynamic, and complex context of our
federal government’s thick political surround. Having clariﬁed the foundational
grounds of analysis, we anticipate that debate about the judicial enforcement of
the separation of powers can proceed on less fallible and more clear-eyed terms.

405.

For evidence of the analogous concern in the federalism context, see Aziz Z. Huq, Does the
Logic of Collective Action Explain Federalism Doctrine?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 217, 295-98 (2014).
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